Cited by 8Cybernetics and Technology in SocietyEthics and Social Impacts of AIInformation Systems Theories and Implementation

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The new ghosts in the machine: 'Pragmatist' AI and the conceptual perils of anthropomorphic description

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Brooker, Phillip, Dutton, William, Mair, Michael·2019·Zentral- und Hochschulbibliothek Luzern

Abstract

Algorithms are becoming interwoven with increasingly many aspects of our affairs. That process of interweaving has brought with it a language laden with anthropomorphic descriptions of the technologies involved, which variously hint at ‘humanesque’ or ‘conscious-like’ activity occurring within or behind their operations. Indeed, the term ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) seems to refer to a quality that is thought to be largely human; namely, intelligence. However, while anthropomorphic descriptions may be useful or harmless, when taken at face value they generate a false picture of algorithms as well as of our own thinking and reasoning practices by treating them as analogues of one another rather than as distinct. Focusing on the algorithm, and what it is misleadingly said to be and to be like, in this article we outline three ‘perspicuous representations’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §122) of AI in specific contexts. Drawing on Wes Sharrock’s ethnomethodological and Wittgensteinian work, our aim is to demonstrate that by attending to the particular, occasioned and locally accountable, not to say highly specified, usages of language that accompany the ‘New AI’ in particular, we can avoid being haunted by the new task performing ghosts currently being discursively conjured up in our algorithmic machines.

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  • This approach shifts focus from how well or badly machines might be designed to emulate human interaction to exploring the social uses of anthropomorphism in HCI, resisting the conflation of computational processes with human minds through a cognitivist/materialist/behaviourist lens.

    “This approach shifts focus from how well or badly machines might be designed to emulate human interaction to exploring the social uses of anthropomorphism in HCI, strictly resisting the conflation of 'computational processes with human minds through a cognitivist/materialist/behaviourist lens' (Brooker et al. 2019: 273).”

    From AI in situated action: a scoping review of ethnomethodological and conversation analytic studies (2025) · cites this paper as Brooker et al. 2019

    Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

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  • Brooker et al. conclude that although using human-like language for machines might seem a convenient shorthand, it may hinder accurate understanding of the inner workings of the AI.

    “The main conclusion is that although using such language might seem a convenient shorthand, it may in fact hinder accurate understanding of the inner workings of the AI.”

    From Deanthropomorphising NLP: Can a language model be conscious? (2024) · cites this paper as [90]

    In “Anthropomorphically Describing AI” (page unavailable), the paper calls shorthand descriptions convenient. In “Discussion: Choosing the Language of AI” (page unavailable), it argues that importing anthropomorphic terms wholesale into philosophical accounts obstructs useful understanding. The claim captures that concern but shifts its focus: the paper specifically warns about decontextualized accounts of practical engagements with AI, rather than saying human-like language generally hinders understanding of AI’s inner workings. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Radically reflexive and praxeological EM/CA studies offer a distinctive contribution to social studies of AI that couples the Garfinkelian 'hands-on' approach with ordinary language philosophy.

    “Radically reflexive and praxeological EM/CA studies offer a distinctive contribution to social studies of AI that couples the Garfinkelian (2002) 'hands-on' approach with the work of 'ordinary language philosophers' such as Ryle and Wittgenstein (Reeves 2017; Brooker et al. 2019; Sormani 2020, 2022; Mair et al. 2021).”
  • Through radical praxeology that places AI in its practical contexts, we can study AI as a social praxis involving configurations of humans, machines, and their interrelations rather than misattributing cognitive capacities to 'ghosts in the machine'.

    “Through these forms of radical praxeology that place AI in its practical contexts, we can study it as a social praxis involving configurations of humans, machines, and their interrelations 21 rather than misattributing cognitive capacities to 'ghosts in the machine' (Brooker et al. 2019; Mair et al. 2021).”

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Metadata

Authors
Brooker, P., Dutton, W., & Mair, M.
Affiliations
  • University of Liverpool (GB)
  • Peak, Manchester
Venue
Zentral- und Hochschulbibliothek Luzern
Publisher
Zentral- und Hochschulbibliothek Luzern
Published
2019-10-04
ISSN
1366-4964 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3022901424
Cited by
8
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Ethnographic Studies (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Information Systems Theories and Implementation
Keywords
artificial intelligence, anthropomorphism, algorithms, pragmatism, Wittgenstein, ethnomethodology, language of technology, algorithmic thinking

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