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Specifying Reusable Security Requirements.
Open accessAbstract
Unlike typical functional requirements, security requirements can potentially be highly reusable, especially if specified as instances of reusable templates.In this column, I will discuss the concepts underlying security engineering including its quality subfactors.I will then address the issue of security requirements and how they differ from the architectural mechanisms that will fulfill them.Then, I will discuss the value of reusable parameterized templates for specifying security requirements and provide an example of such a template and its associated usage.Finally, I will outline an asset-based riskdriven analysis approach for determining the appropriate actual parameters to use when reusing such parameterized templates to specify security requirements. CONCEPTS UNDERLYING SECURITY ENGINEERINGTo specify security requirements, it is critical to first understand the concepts underlying security engineering.And the most important concept of these is 'security' itself.Whereas security is often defined as an incomplete subset of its most important quality subfactors (e.g., integrity and privacy), the following figure illustrates that a more general and complete definition of security is that it is the degree to which malicious 1 (i.e., unauthorized and intentional) harm to valuable system assets is prevented, reduced, and properly responded to.Thus, security is about protecting these assets (e.g., data, services, hardware, and personnel) from harm due to various kinds of attacks (e.g., password sniffing, spoofing, viruses) that may be mounted by the various kinds of attackers (e.g., hackers, crackers, disgruntled employees, international cyber-terrorists, industrial spies, governmental spies, foreign military, etc.).These assets are at risk due both to various kinds of threats (e.g., theft, vandalism, unauthorized disclosure, destruction, fraud, extortion, espionage, trespass, etc.) of attack as well as the vulnerabilities the system may 1 Some may argue that the term 'malicious' is too strong.What about people who vandalize the website of a company that pollutes the environment?What about someone who uses company computers to surf the Web in violation of company policy.The first example is a cybercrime and the second is an unauthorized use of property.In both cases, the victims would be justified to consider these acts malicious.If the term 'malicious' still seems too harsh, just consider it to mean the combination of unauthorized and intentional.
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Citations
Cited by
Security Requirements Engineering: A Framework for Representation and Analysis
Haley, C. B., Laney, R., Moffett, J. D., & Nuseibeh, B. (2008) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.2007.70754 · Cited by 462
Principles and business processes for responsible AI
Clarke, R. (2019) · Computer Law & Security Review · doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2019.04.007 · Cited by 117
Metadata
- Authors
- Firesmith, D.
- Venue
- The Journal of Object Technology
- Published
- 2004
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 61
- ISSN
- 1660-1769 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2124105024
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 36.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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