Generating Correct Moral Judgments: Extending Kant’s Categorical Imperative Procedure Beyond Rawls and Wood
Open accessAbstract
Kant’s account of moral judgment reveals that the Categorical Imperative functions not as a corrective rule but as the law of judgment itself: correct moral judgments arise directly through testing maxims for moral worth. Allen Wood’s realist reading misinterprets this relation by subordinating moral character to intellectual capacity and treating the imperative as a means of correction. John Rawls’s constructivist interpretation captures Kant’s procedural intent more faithfully, viewing moral judgment as the outcome of a four-step Categorical Imperative Procedure that tests whether a maxim can become a universal law. Yet a procedure grounded solely in the Formula of Universal Law cannot examine the moral motive or the autonomy of the will. Integrating Kant’s Formulas of Humanity and Autonomy yields a six-step model that supplements universalizability and willability with two further criteria: the end-test, ensuring that humanity is treated as an end in itself, and the legislation-test, confirming that the will legislates universally and autonomously. This augmented structure preserves Rawls’s constructivist framework while meeting Kant’s demand that moral worth derive from duty, respect for humanity, and the self-legislation of reason, thereby providing a more coherent and textually grounded account of how correct moral judgments are generated within a Kantian framework.
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TL;DR
The paper argues that Kant’s Categorical Imperative directly generates correct moral judgments, not merely corrects them, and that Rawls’s constructivist four-step CI Procedure is closer to Kant than Wood’s realist reading but incomplete. It proposes extending Rawls’s procedure to six steps by adding a Formula of Humanity end-test and a Formula of Autonomy legislation-test.
Key findings
- Wood’s realist interpretation is rejected because it treats the Categorical Imperative as a corrective to ordinary moral reason, whereas Kant presents the moral law as an a priori “fact of reason” and the imperative as “the law of judgment” itself.
- Rawls’s four-step CI Procedure is endorsed as capturing Kant’s procedural intent: a maxim that passes the test is universalizable and morally correct, as illustrated by the false-promise example, where universalized deceit makes promising impossible.
- Rawls’s procedure remains incomplete because it tests only universalizability, not motive or autonomy; the maxim “In order to obtain greater advantage, I will be honest and keep my promises” passes Steps (1)–(4) but fails the proposed Step (5) because it treats others merely as means.
- The paper adds Step (5), the end-test, and Step (6), the legislation-test, yielding a six-step procedure organized into three tiers: Universality, End, and Legislation; a divine-command maxim “I shall not kill” passes Steps (1)–(5) but fails Step (6) as heteronomous.
Methods
- Conceptual and text-interpretive analysis of Kant’s *Groundwork* and *Critique of Practical Reason*, Allen Wood’s realist reading, and John Rawls’s constructivist CI Procedure.
- The paper reconstructs Rawls’s four-step procedure, applies it to maxims such as false promising and honesty-for-advantage, and proposes an augmented six-step procedure by integrating the Formulas of Humanity and Autonomy.
- No empirical sample, dataset, or quantitative analysis is reported.
Limitations
- The paper does not state limitations of its own analysis.
- It states that Rawls’s four-step procedure cannot examine moral motive or the autonomy of the will and admits counterexamples; this is presented as the limitation motivating the extension.
- Evident from the text: the argument is philosophical and text-interpretive, relying on selected Kantian examples and constructed counterexamples rather than systematic empirical or historical evidence.
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Integrity signals
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 42 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Interpretationreasoning
The four-step CI Procedure admits counterexamples: a maxim may pass the test and yet still lack moral worth.
“The difficulty, however, is that his four-step procedure admits counterexamples: a maxim may pass the test and yet, for Kant, still lack moral worth.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [16]
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- Interpretationreasoning
A correct moral judgment arises precisely when the maxim of an action can become, and is willed as, a universal law.
“From this it follows that a correct moral judgment arises precisely when the maxim of an action can become, and is willed as, a universal law.”
- Also stated in: § 3. Rawls: The Categorical Imperative as the Generation of Moral Judgment · plain
“a correct moral judgment arises when the will acts according to a maxim that meets this law-likeness condition, tested through the CI Procedure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [9]
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- cites [11]
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- Also stated in: § 3. Rawls: The Categorical Imperative as the Generation of Moral Judgment · plain
- Interpretationcitation
Wood's claim that moral character follows upon intellectual capacity is inconsistent with Kant's view of the moral law as an a priori fact of reason.
“First, his claim that moral character follows upon intellectual capacity is inconsistent with Kant's view of moral law as an a priori fact of reason.”
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- Premisecitation
True morality requires that the will act from duty rather than merely in accordance with duty.
“As Kant notes,”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A maxim gains moral worth only when it satisfies the Categorical Imperative's universalizability condition.
“The maxim gains moral worth only when it satisfies the imperative's universalizability condition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [9]
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- Interpretationreasoning
Rawls's interpretation remains incomplete because it cannot account for cases in which a maxim formally passes the procedure but still lacks moral worth.
“Yet Rawls's interpretation remains incomplete.Because it rests solely on the Formula of Universal Law, it cannot account for cases in which a maxim formally passes the procedure but still lacks moral worth.”
- Also stated in: § 5. Conclusion · plain
“though it remains incomplete: the four-step procedure derived from the Formula of Universal Law cannot assess the motive of action or the autonomy of the will.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [16]
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- Also stated in: § 5. Conclusion · plain
- Interpretationcitation
The Categorical Imperative is the principle through which the will itself produces correct moral judgments, not a posterior regulation meant to correct the will's errors.
“The Categorical Imperative is not a posterior regulation meant to correct the will's errors; it is the principle through which the will itself produces correct moral judgments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [8]
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- cites [9]
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- Interpretationreasoning
A procedure grounded solely in the Formula of Universal Law cannot examine the moral motive or the autonomy of the will.
“Yet a procedure grounded solely in the Formula of Universal Law cannot examine the moral motive or the autonomy of the will.”
- Also stated in: § 3. Rawls: The Categorical Imperative as the Generation of Moral Judgment · plain
“Because it rests solely on the Formula of Universal Law, it cannot account for cases in which a maxim formally passes the procedure but still lacks moral worth.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Extending the CI Procedure · plain
“A procedure based solely on the Formula of Universal Law cannot examine this inner principle.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [16]
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- cites [18]
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- Also stated in: § 3. Rawls: The Categorical Imperative as the Generation of Moral Judgment · plain
- Interpretationreasoning
On the question of how correct moral judgments are produced, Rawls's constructivist approach, once supplemented with the Humanity and Autonomy tests, offers a more coherent and textually grounded account than Wood's realist correction model.
“Yet on the question of how correct moral judgments are produced, Rawls's constructivist approachonce supplemented with the Humanity and Autonomy testsoffers a more coherent and textually grounded account than Wood's realist correction model.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [10]
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- cites [16]
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- cites [18]
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- Interpretationreasoning
The maxim 'In order to obtain greater advantage, I will be honest and keep my promises' passes the four-step CI Procedure because no contradiction arises and the resulting world would function smoothly.
“No contradiction seems to arise.A world where everyone keeps promises to gain advantage would function smoothly; honesty would lower transaction costs and enhance reputation, which agents could rationally will.The maxim thus passes the CI Procedure and, under Rawls's account, the action appears moral.”
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- cites [15]
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- Interpretationcitation
Many civic virtues, such as keeping promises for reputation, are universalizable but lack moral worth when done from inclination.
“Many civic virtues (e.g., keeping promises for reputation) are universalizable but lack worth when done from inclination.”
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- Premisecitation
The authority of the moral law derives not from external command but from reason's self-legislation.
“The authority of moral law derives not from external command but from reason's self-legislation.”
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- Interpretationcitation
The CI Procedure tests only the form of maxims-their universalizability-not their motive.
“This exposes a structural limitation.The CI Procedure tests only the form of maxims-their universalizability-not their motive.”
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- Interpretationreasoning
Any heteronomous maxim, even if universalizable and end-respecting, lacks moral worth.
“Any heteronomous maxim, even if universalizable and end-respecting, lacks moral worth.”
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- Interpretationcitation
The five-step version of the CI Procedure still cannot exclude heteronomous motives.
“Yet the five-step version still cannot exclude heteronomous motives.”
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- Interpretationreasoning
The Formula of Humanity can serve as a further criterion within the CI Procedure, adding Step (5): in the adjusted order yielded at Step (4), humanity in any individual is treated as an end, never merely as a means.
“Accordingly, the Formula of Humanity can serve as a further criterion within the procedure.I propose adding: (5): In the adjusted order yielded at Step (4), humanity in the person of any individual is treated as an end, never merely as a means.”
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- Interpretationcitation
Kant would deny the honesty-for-advantage maxim moral worth because its motive is advantage, which is hypothetical.
“Yet Kant would deny it moral worth, since the motive-advantage-is hypothetical.”
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- May combine two claims. 12
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 1
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InterpretationreasoningThe moral law lies latent within rationality itself and surfaces when inclination or interest produces conflict.
“The moral law lies latent within rationality itself, surfacing when inclination or interest produces conflict.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [7]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationKant's Categorical Imperative functions not as a corrective rule but as the law of judgment itself, so correct moral judgments arise directly through testing maxims for moral worth.
“Kant's account of moral judgment reveals that the Categorical Imperative functions not as a corrective rule but as the law of judgment itself: correct moral judgments arise directly through testing maxims for moral worth.”
- Also stated in: § 2. Wood: The Categorical Imperative as a Correction of Moral Judgment · plain
“the Categorical Imperative is not a corrective instrument but the very principle of moral judgment.”
- Also stated in: § 5. Conclusion · plain
“the Categorical Imperative functions as the law of judgment itself, not as a mere corrective device.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [8]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites [9]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Also stated in: § 2. Wood: The Categorical Imperative as a Correction of Moral Judgment · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningRawls's constructivist interpretation captures Kant's procedural intent more faithfully than Wood's realist reading, viewing moral judgment as the outcome of a four-step Categorical Imperative Procedure that tests whether a maxim can become a universal law.
“John Rawls's constructivist interpretation captures Kant's procedural intent more faithfully, viewing moral judgment as the outcome of a four-step Categorical Imperative Procedure that tests whether a maxim can become a universal law.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“This paper argues that Rawls's interpretation better reflects Kant's text, though it remains incomplete: a procedure based solely on the Formula of Universal Law still permits counterexamples.”
- Also stated in: § 5. Conclusion · plain
“His interpretation accords more closely with Kant's intent, though it remains incomplete”
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- cites [12]
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- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAllen Wood's realist reading misinterprets Kant by subordinating moral character to intellectual capacity and treating the Categorical Imperative as a means of correction.
“Allen Wood's realist reading misinterprets this relation by subordinating moral character to intellectual capacity and treating the imperative as a means of correction.”
- Also stated in: § 2. Wood: The Categorical Imperative as a Correction of Moral Judgment · plain
“Wood's account misreads Kant by treating the imperative as an external corrective to ordinary reason, rather than as the internal rule of moral cognition itself.”
- Also stated in: § 5. Conclusion · plain
“Wood misreads this relation by positing a temporal priority of intellectual capacity and treating moral principles as subsequent constraints.”
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- cites [6]
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- Also stated in: § 2. Wood: The Categorical Imperative as a Correction of Moral Judgment · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationFor Kant, moral principles are not empirically acquired correctives but are intrinsic to rational agency, so moral character does not emerge after intellectual reasoning but already operates within it.
“Moral principles are not empirically acquired correctives but intrinsic to rational agency.Therefore, moral character does not emerge after intellectual reasoning-it already operates within it.”
- Also stated in: § 2. Wood: The Categorical Imperative as a Correction of Moral Judgment · plain
“pure practical reason is not posterior to empirical practical reason; rather, it grounds it from the outset.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [7]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Also stated in: § 2. Wood: The Categorical Imperative as a Correction of Moral Judgment · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRawls's four-step Categorical Imperative Procedure tests whether a maxim can be universalized, and a maxim that passes is moral while one that fails is not.
“Rawls holds that correct moral judgments are generated through a four-step Categorical Imperative Procedure (CI Procedure) that tests the maxim of an action.If the maxim passes this test, the corresponding action is moral.”
- Also stated in: § 3. Rawls: The Categorical Imperative as the Generation of Moral Judgment · plain
“a maxim that passes is moral; one that fails is not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [10]
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- cites [12]
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- cites [14]
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- Also stated in: § 3. Rawls: The Categorical Imperative as the Generation of Moral Judgment · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe universalizability test discerns contradiction but not the ground of action.
“The universalizability test discerns contradiction but not the ground of action.”
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InterpretationcitationA final Step (6) is required: the maxim exhibits the will's principle of universal legislation-the law is autonomous, not heteronomous.
“Hence, a final step is required: (6): The maxim exhibits the will's principle of universal legislation-the law is autonomous, not heteronomous.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [18]
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InterpretationcitationThe maxim 'I shall not kill' derived from divine command passes the first five steps but fails Kant's autonomy condition because its source lies in divine authority, not autonomous reason.
“Consider the maxim”
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May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTo remedy the CI Procedure's inability to examine motive, the Formulas of Humanity and Autonomy must be integrated, so a maxim must be universalizable, treat humanity as an end, and express the autonomy of reason's own legislation.
“To remedy this, the Formulas of Humanity and Autonomy must be integrated.A maxim must (1) be universalizable, (2) treat humanity as an end, and (3) express the autonomy of reason's own legislation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [16]
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May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningRe-testing the maxim 'In order to obtain greater advantage, I will be honest' shows Steps (1)-(4) reveal no contradiction, but Step (5) fails because the rational nature of others is used as a means to gain; thus the maxim, though universalizable, lacks moral worth.
“Re-testing”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [16]
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May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationBoth Rawls and Wood reinterpret Kant in light of their own commitments.
“Viewed within the broader realist-constructivist debate, both Rawls and Wood reinterpret Kant in light of their own commitments.”
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Cites
Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy
Dombrowski, D. A. (2001) · International Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5840/ipq200141441 · Cited by 787 · cited 1× · see citing works
“[14] In Step 1, the agent formulates a maxim: action X for end Y in condition C. Step 2 universalizes it.”
Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy
Rawls, J. (2000) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/jj.41262604 · Cited by 124
Wood, A. (2017) · doi:10.1017/9781108332736 · Cited by 26 · cited 1×
“[1] Wood’s interpretation rests on two central claims: (1) moral capacity operates only after intellectual capacity, and therefore moral principles function merely as correctives; and (2) when an agent experiences moral tension, moral principles serve as a means to escape from obligation.”
Flagged first, then by citations
2 of the 5 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 16
- Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yele University Press, 19.
- Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yele University Press, 37.
- Wood, A.(2017). Formulas of the Moral Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 22.
- Wood, A.(2017). Formulas of the Moral Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 39.
- Wood, A.(2017). Formulas of the Moral Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 25.
- Kant.(2015). Critique of Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 41.
- Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yele University Press, 54-55.
- Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yele University Press, 41.
- Rawls, J. (1999). Collected Papers.Edited by Samuel Freeman. London: Harvard University Press, 515.
- Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yele University Press, 37.
- Rawls, J. (1999). Collected Papers.Edited by Samuel Freeman. London: Harvard University Press, 498.
- Rawls, J. (1999). Collected Papers. Edited by Samuel Freeman. London: Harvard University Press, 514.
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- Rawls, J. (2000). Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 163.
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- Authors
- Zhu, Z.
- Affiliations
- Beijing Normal University (CN)
- Corresponding author
- Zhu, Ziyu
- Venue
- Academic Journal of Management and Social Sciences
- Publisher
- Darcy & Roy Press Co. Ltd.
- Published
- 2025-10-30
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 138-142
- ISSN
- 2958-2806 (ISSN-L)
- 2958-4396
- OpenAlex
- W4415716858
- Semantic Scholar
- fbe2e78db59f1fcf2fd52c6d7c5b3da05a1d8547
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Academic journal of management and social sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Keywords
- Kant's categorical imperative, moral judgment, John Rawls, Allen Wood, Formula of Universal Law, Formula of Humanity, universalizability, moral motives, obligation, respect for humanity, constructivism, moral realism
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