The DOI matches its Crossref record; 75 of the 75 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms
Abstract
We contribute to multiple agency theory by examining cases in which ventures making initial public offerings (IPOs) have managerial agents on their boards whose goals conflict with those of the investment bank agents hired to underwrite the stock. Underwriters have an incentive to underprice IPOs to maintain strong ties with institutional investors. We develop theory on agent differences based on time horizons and risk taking by managerial agents as framed through behavioral agency theory. Examining governance mechanisms, we find both monitoring by board insiders and board experience decrease underpricing. Furthermore, underpricing increases when venture capitalists have prior ties with underwriters.
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Cites
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Cited by
State-owned Enterprises Around the WORLD as Hybrid Organizations
Bruton, G. D., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Stan, C., & Xu, K. (2015) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2013.0069 · Cited by 783
Wilhelm, M. M., Blome, C., Bhakoo, V., & Paulraj, A. (2016) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2015.11.001 · Cited by 539
Anglin, A. H., Short, J. C., Drover, W., Stevenson, R. M., McKenny, A. F., & Allison, T. H. (2018) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2018.03.003 · Cited by 451
Bruton, G. D., Filatotchev, I., Chahine, S., & Wright, M. (2010) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.822 · Cited by 443
Corporate Governance and Investors' Perceptions of Foreign IPO Value: An Institutional Perspective
Bell, R. G., Filatotchev, I., & Aguilera, R. V. (2014) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2011.0146 · Cited by 429
Metadata
- Authors
- Arthurs, J. D., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., & Johnson, R. A.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2008-04
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 277-294
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2101402308
- Cited by
- 361
- References
- 75
- FWCI
- 53.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Arthurs, J. D., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., & Johnson, R. A. (2008). Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2008.31767256
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.