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Cited by 361

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 75 of the 75 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms

Arthurs, Jonathan D., Hoskisson, Robert E., Busenitz, Lowell W., Johnson, Richard A.·2008·Academy of Management Journal

Abstract

We contribute to multiple agency theory by examining cases in which ventures making initial public offerings (IPOs) have managerial agents on their boards whose goals conflict with those of the investment bank agents hired to underwrite the stock. Underwriters have an incentive to underprice IPOs to maintain strong ties with institutional investors. We develop theory on agent differences based on time horizons and risk taking by managerial agents as framed through behavioral agency theory. Examining governance mechanisms, we find both monitoring by board insiders and board experience decrease underpricing. Furthermore, underpricing increases when venture capitalists have prior ties with underwriters.

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Crossref · 10.5465/amj.2008.31767256

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Metadata

Authors
Arthurs, J. D., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., & Johnson, R. A.
Venue
Academy of Management Journal
Published
2008-04
Volume
51
Issue
2
Pages
277-294
ISSN
  • 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
  • 1948-0989
OpenAlex
W2101402308
Cited by
361
References
75
FWCI
53.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5465/amj.2008.31767256
The paper
Arthurs, J. D., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., & Johnson, R. A. (2008). Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2008.31767256

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.