The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pay without Performance: Overview of the issues
Abstract
Executive Overview In a recent book, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Bebchuk and Fried critique existing executive pay arrangements and the corporate governance processes that produce them. They also put forward proposals for improving both executive pay and corporate governance. This paper provides an overview of the main elements of their critique and proposals. The authors show that, under current legal arrangements, boards cannot be expected to contract at arm's length with the executives whose pay they set. They discuss how managers' influence can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that researchers subscribing to the arm's-length contracting view have long considered as puzzling. The authors also explain how managerial influence can lead to inefficient arrangements that generate weak or even perverse incentives, as well as to arrangements that make the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay less transparent. Finally, they outline proposals for improving the transparency of executive pay, the connection between pay and performance, and the accountability of corporate boards.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
Corporate governance and firm valuation
Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2006) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2006.05.005 · Cited by 1,275
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
CHHAOCHHARIA, V., & GRINSTEIN, Y. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x · Cited by 611
Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe
Enriques, L., & Volpin, P. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.1.117 · Cited by 476
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: Evidence from Index Thresholds
Crane, A. D., Michenaud, S., & Weston, J. P. (2016) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhw012 · Cited by 472
Metadata
- Authors
- Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Perspectives
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-24
- ISSN
- 1558-9080 (ISSN-L)
- 1943-4529
- OpenAlex
- W3125242617
- Cited by
- 573
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 128.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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