Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 162

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

From the Editors—Why We Need a Theory of Stakeholder Governance—And Why This is a Hard Problem

Open access
Amis, John, Barney, Jay, Mahoney, Joseph T., Wang, Heli·2020·Academy of Management Review

Abstract

Corporate governance is an important topic for both scholars and practicing managers. To date, most work on this subject has focused on how to resolve potential conflicts of interest between a firm’s senior managers and its shareholders in how firms create and distribute economic value. This work, based in agency theory (Alchian&Demsetz,1972; Jensen&Meckling,1976),has led to the design of a variety of corporate governance mechanisms that have been widely implemented by many firmsaroundtheworld (Aguilera& Jackson,2003; Williamson, 1996). These mechanisms include incentive programs for senior managers—such as CEO compensation in the form of stock and stock options based on firm performance—that act as management “bonding” devices (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), and a variety of disciplinary mechanisms—such as the inclusion of “outsiders”onboardsof directors and legallymandated reporting requirements—that increase the ability of shareholders to “monitor” the performance of a firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Work on using governance to resolve possible conflicts between senior managers and shareholders has largely developed separately from governance questions focused on the broader relationships between a firm and its multiple stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston,1995;Freeman,1984).This is ironic sincesome of the earliest work on agency theory conceptualized a firm as “a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 310). These individuals, including “individuals” as legal fictions, can be viewed as a firm’s stakeholders. However, instead of examining how governance could enable a firm to work with all of its stakeholders in creating and distributing economic value, agency theorists have mostly focused on governing the relationship between managers and only a single stakeholder: shareholders. An ideawhose timehas come is that of considering more directly the governance of relations between a firm and its multiple stakeholders and not just with its shareholders. This will necessitate broadening the conceptualization of the value created by a firm beyond simply shareholder return (Barney, 2018; McGahan, 2020), a requirement accentuated by the recent COVID-19 public health crisis (Carney, 2020). However, on the face of it, the analysis of stakeholder governance seems likely to be a more difficult problem than the governance of manager– shareholder relations. Theories of shareholder governance focus on how economic value is created by and distributed between two groups—shareholders and senior managers—that are relatively homogenous with respect to their (sometimes)-conflicting interests regarding how they would like to see a firm managed (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Governance mechanisms designed to reconcile these potential conflicts are relatively straightforward to formulate, although not always easy to implement (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Tihanyi, Graffin, & George, 2014). Stakeholder governance, however, must deal with much broader relationships between a firm and its multiple stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1984) and the associated creation and distribution of value across them. Conventional corporate finance suggests that, with perfect factor markets, a firm that maximizes the wealth of its shareholders as its sole residual claimants will correspondingly maximize the economic value of the firm (Jensen, 2001).However, this isnot the case in a world of incomplete contracting and strategic factor markets: maximizing shareholder wealth does not necessarily address the conflicting economic interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, and other stakeholders, and thus does not necessarily maximize the value of the firm (Barney, 1986, 2018; Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2012; Zingales, 2000). Moreover, while shareholder governance has primarily focused on economic returns, stakeholders can have interests that go well beyond narrow economic concerns (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; Carney, 2020; McGahan, 2020). Employees, for example, are likely to be concerned about appropriating some of the economic profits their human capital helps to create (Morris, Alvarez, Barney, &Molloy, 2017), butmay also have interests in personal health (Michel, 2011), work life quality (Lambert, 2000), internal and external pay

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.5465/amr.2020.0181

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 4 references

Cited by

See all 162

Metadata

Authors
Amis, J., Barney, J., Mahoney, J. T., & Wang, H.
Venue
Academy of Management Review
Published
2020-07
Volume
45
Issue
3
Pages
499-503
ISSN
  • 0363-7425 (ISSN-L)
  • 1930-3807
OpenAlex
W3045602548
Cited by
162
References
4
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: From the Editors—Why We Need a Theory of Stakeholder Governance—And Why This is a Hard Problem. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5465/amr.2020.0181
The paper
Amis, J., Barney, J., Mahoney, J. T., & Wang, H. (2020). From the Editors—Why We Need a Theory of Stakeholder Governance—And Why This is a Hard Problem. Academy of Management Review. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2020.0181

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.