The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Principle of Indifference Does Not Lead to Contradictions
Open accessAbstract
The Principle of Indifference says that if there are a finite number of propositions and a state of knowledge according to which none of the propositions is more plausible than any other, then, conditional on that knowledge, all of them have the same probability. Most researchers reject the principle because there exist counterexamples believed to prove that it leads to contradictions. We analyse three examples representative of the objections to the principle and show that, rather than disproving it, they suffer from a common error in applying it. From this and the fact that the Principle of Indifference complies with plausible reasoning we conclude that it does not lead to contradictions.
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“Normalization imposes limitations to Bernoulli's Principle of Insufficient Reason (PrOIR), otherwise known as the Principle of Indifference [17-19].”
From Is cosmological tuning fine or coarse? (2021) · cites this paper as [19]
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Jaynes, E. T., & Bretthorst, G. L. (2003) · Cited by 4,600
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Jaynes, E. T. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790423 · Cited by 4,045
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Dissolving the Wine/Water Paradox
Mikkelson, J. M. (2004) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/55.1.137 · Cited by 21
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Sorted by citations
Is cosmological tuning fine or coarse?
Díaz-Pachón, D. A., Hössjer, O., & Marks II, R. J. (2021) · Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics · doi:10.1088/1475-7516/2021/07/020 · Cited by 10
Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution
Luna, L. (2018) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axy045 · Cited by 2
Fiorillo, C. D., & Kim, S. L. (2021) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies6010024
Country readiness for Sargassum valorisation in the Caribbean
Bennett, M., March, A., Li, H., Lallemand, P., Marechal, J.-P., Chen, Y., & Failler, P. (2026) · Environmental Development · doi:10.1016/j.envdev.2026.101496
Metadata
- Authors
- Tschirk, W.
- Affiliations
- University of Vienna (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Tschirk, Wolfgang
- ORCID
- Tschirk, Wolfgang
- Venue
- International Journal of Statistics and Probability
- Published
- 2016-06-21
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 79
- ISSN
- 1927-7032 (ISSN-L)
- 1927-7040
- OpenAlex
- W2460818089
- Cited by
- 4
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 0.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- International Journal of Statistics and Probability (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- principle of indifference, probability, counterexample, state of knowledge, plausible reasoning, epistemology of probability
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