The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Social Welfare: A Utilitarian Critique
Open accessAbstract
Many scholars and managers endorse the idea that the primary purpose of the firm is to make money for its owners. This shareholder wealth maximization objective is justified on the grounds that it maximizes social welfare. In this article, the first of a two-part set, we argue that, although this shareholder primacy model may have been appropriate in an earlier era, it no longer is, given our current state of economic and social affairs. To make our case, we employ a utilitarian moral standard and examine the apparent logical sequence behind the link between shareholder wealth maximization and social welfare. Upon close empirical and conceptual scrutiny, we find that utilitarian criteria do not support the shareholder model; that is, shareholder wealth maximization is only weakly linked to social welfare maximization. In view of the dubious validity of this sequential argument, we outline some of the features of a superior corporate objective—a variant of normative stakeholder theory. In the second article, we will advance and defend our preferred alternative and then discuss some institutional arrangements under which it could be implemented.
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Cites
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Cited by
How Applying Instrumental Stakeholder Theory Can Provide Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Jones, T. M., Harrison, J. S., & Felps, W. (2018) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2016.0111 · Cited by 674
Self-citationStakeholder Engagement: Past, Present, and Future
Kujala, J., Sachs, S., Leinonen, H., Heikkinen, A., & Laude, D. (2022) · Business & Society · doi:10.1177/00076503211066595 · Cited by 590
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Bridoux, F., & Stoelhorst, J. W. (2016) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2013.0475 · Cited by 335
Purpose in the For-Profit Firm: A Review and Framework for Management Research
George, G., Haas, M. R., McGahan, A. M., Schillebeeckx, S. J. D., & Tracey, P. (2023) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/01492063211006450 · Cited by 285
Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, T. M., & Felps, W.
- Venue
- Business Ethics Quarterly
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-04
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 207-238
- ISSN
- 1052-150X (ISSN-L)
- 2153-3326
- OpenAlex
- W2119597906
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 35.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.