The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 4 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Divine Simplicity, Contingent Truths, and Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing
Open accessAbstract
A well-known objection to divine simplicity holds that the doctrine is incompatible with God's contingent knowledge. I set out the objection and reject two problematic solutions. I then argue that the objection is best answered by adopting an "extrinsic model of divine knowing" according to which God's contingent knowledge, which varies across worlds, does not involve any intrinsic variation in God. Solutions along these lines have been suggested by others. This paper advances the discussion by developing and offering partial defenses of three such models.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Since an entity that exists contingently cannot be identical to an entity that exists necessarily, it follows from the conjunction of (CK), (KT), and (NB), that there is distinction in God between the necessarily existing divine substance and the contingent entity or entities implied by God's contingent knowledge.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 1. Divine Simplicity and the Problem of God's Contingent Knowledge
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Rests on an assumption: The divine substance exists necessarily (NB).
- Rests on an assumption: Necessarily, God's knowing some truth T implies some entity intrinsic to God that would not exist were God not knowing T (KT).
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“So, (CK), (KT), (NB), and (ST) are incompatible.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 1. Divine Simplicity and the Problem of God's Contingent Knowledge
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- The authors state this as an assumption: God is omniscient.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are contingent truths.
- Rests on an assumption: The divine substance exists necessarily (NB).
- Rests on an assumption: The divine substance is not composed in any way, and there are no entities intrinsic to God distinct from the divine substance (ST).
- Rests on an assumption: Necessarily, God's knowing some truth T implies some entity intrinsic to God that would not exist were God not knowing T (KT).
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Such distinction contradicts (ST).”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 1. Divine Simplicity and the Problem of God's Contingent Knowledge
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Rests on an assumption: The divine substance is not composed in any way, and there are no entities intrinsic to God distinct from the divine substance (ST).
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As we have seen, the conjunction of (CK) and (KT) implies the existence of a contingent entity intrinsic to God.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 1. Divine Simplicity and the Problem of God's Contingent Knowledge
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Rests on an assumption: Necessarily, God's knowing some truth T implies some entity intrinsic to God that would not exist were God not knowing T (KT).
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“but I see no grounds for thinking a belief can't play this role if it is a relation to a proposition and not an internal state.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 11
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes? Checkable: unclear✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I think the foregoing is enough to show that the Belief Model is at least prima facie defensible.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 11
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes? Checkable: unclear✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The Agency Model shares this advantage, which can be seen from the fact that on this model God knows contingent objects in the very act of bringing them about, and these acts, since they are relations to the objects known, have the objects known as constituents.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 47
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The latter violates omniscience.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 2. Problematic Solutions: Rejecting (CK) or (NB)
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- The authors state this as an assumption: God is omniscient.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“So, whatever the force of the presentist objection, there is a plausible, extrinsic model of divine knowing that would enable a proponent of simplicity to reject (KT) and thus to respond to the problem of God's contingent knowledge.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“To reject (KT), while retaining (ST), (CK), and (NB), requires endorsing an extrinsic model of divine knowing, a model on which God's contingent knowledge, which varies across worlds, does not involve any intrinsic variation in God.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3. Rejecting (KT): Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Rests on an assumption: The divine substance exists necessarily (NB).
- Rests on an assumption: The divine substance is not composed in any way, and there are no entities intrinsic to God distinct from the divine substance (ST).
- Rests on an assumption: Necessarily, God's knowing some truth T implies some entity intrinsic to God that would not exist were God not knowing T (KT).
- Probably not a substantial claim. 19
- It may state two separate claims as one. 14
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But, surely, scientists haven't made a comparable discovery regarding God's beliefs.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 11
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, defending the Belief Model requires none of (i)-(iii); defending the Immediate Cognition Model probably requires (i) and possibly (if Brower is right about aseity) (ii) and (iii); and defending the Agency Model requires all of (i)-(iii).”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 47
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“God brings about E for a reason, and thus his activity is intentional and purposeful; yet, God's reason leaves him free to refrain from causing E, and refraining is consistent with all that God is intrinsically, including his wisdom and goodness.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.3 The Agency Model
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Intentional activity is inherently cognitional.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(l) A divine causal act consists in a causal or bringing about relation to an effect.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 43
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“God's knowledge of contingent reality is unmediated in the strongest sense possible.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Load-bearingStrength:boosted· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(m) This relation does not involve any intrinsic state of God that would be otherwise were the relation not holding, were God not so causing.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 43
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“On the extrinsic model of divine agency, God's act of causing or bringing about some effect E consists in a causal relation to E, and God would be no different intrinsically were he not standing in that relation, were he not causing E.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.3 The Agency Model
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Miller, A Most Unlikely God
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Brower, 'Simplicity and Aseity'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Pruss, 'Two Problems'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“So, as stated, this function objection to Thau has no force against claim (g) of the Belief Model.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 11
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“and one that enables a proponent of (ST) to reject (KT), and thus to respond to the problem of God's contingent knowledge.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The presentist objection, if sound, topples the Immediate Cognition Model, but it has no such consequence for the Belief Model.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A second response concedes that if only the present exists, then the Immediate Cognition Model won't work for God's knowledge of the past and future.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The great medieval proponents of simplicity, Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, seem to have accepted (i)-(iii), 50”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 47
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The Immediate Cognition Model is an attempt to supply such an account, and one that enables a proponent of (ST) to reject (KT), and thus to respond to the problem of God's contingent knowledge.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: The concrete universe is not made up of propositions.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“While the Belief and Immediate Cognition models tell us what God's contingent acts of knowing consist in, they do not explain how God is in cognitive contact with the contingent objects he knows.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 47
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Just as on the Belief Model a divine act of believing has the proposition believed as an essential constituent (along with the believing relation to it), so on the Immediate Cognition Model God's act of knowing has the contingent reality known as an essential constituent.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(o) God is the cause of all contingent entities.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 43
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(j) All God's acts of knowing regarding contingent realities consist in relations to contingent realities existing outside of God.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Perhaps, on the first two models, God's knowing contingent objects is a brute fact, with no further explanation as to how he is in contact with them.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 47
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“One thing clear from the brief responses to these objections is that defending the Agency Model requires adopting what are, from the perspective of contemporary philosophy, a number of highly controversial metaphysical and theological positions-(i) that all time is present to God, (ii) that free creaturely choices are caused by God, and (iii) that all evil is privation.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 47
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(k) These relations do not involve any intrinsic states of God that would be otherwise were the relations not holding, were God not so knowing.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If the claim is that God knows what he creates by knowing what he is intrinsically, then problems arise of the sort discussed in section 2. If he knows what he creates by knowing some intrinsic property distinct from his essence, then he is not simple.If he knows what he creates by knowing his essence, then there is no world in which the God who created the actual universe does otherwise.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.3 The Agency Model
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Presumably, he is not in cognitive contact by being acted upon by contingent objects; for being acted upon likely involves being affected intrinsically, and being affected intrinsically would introduce contingent intrinsic states in God, contrary to simplicity.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 47
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the end, a choice between the models will come down to judgments individual proponents of simplicity make regarding the balance of costs and benefits.51”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > And God knows privations because he knows the difference between what he brings about and what perfections things ought to have given their natures.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(i) All God's knowledge consists in occurrent acts of knowing.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3.2 The Immediate Cognition Model
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✗ Asserted: fails✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Rejecting (NB) would not work for someone who thinks God's perfection requires that he exist necessarily in the standard sense, or who posits God to account for beings that exist contingently in the standard sense.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 2. Problematic Solutions: Rejecting (CK) or (NB)
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes? Based: unclearIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(a)-(c) or (d) plus Content Essentialism entails (KT).”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 3. Rejecting (KT): Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Content Essentialism: beliefs, and states or acts of knowing, have their content essentially.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“To reject (CK) requires either denying that there are contingent truths, or admitting contingent truths, but denying that God knows any of them.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 2. Problematic Solutions: Rejecting (CK) or (NB)
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are contingent truths.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The former means nothing could really be (or have been) otherwise, with the consequence that neither God nor any human being could really do (or have done) otherwise.”
§ DIVINE SIMPLICITY, CONTINGENT TRUTHS, AND EXTRINSIC MODELS OF DIVINE KNOWING > 2. Problematic Solutions: Rejecting (CK) or (NB)
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are contingent truths.
The paper relies on this without support.
Content Essentialism: beliefs, and states or acts of knowing, have their content essentially.
“Content Essentialism, the claim that beliefs, and states or acts of knowing, have their content essentially.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The objects of belief are propositions, and propositions are abstract entities of a platonic sort that exist independently of the subjects who believe them.
“Let us assume that the objects of belief are propositions and that propositions are abstract entities of a platonic sort, entities that exist independently of the subjects who believe them.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
A subject can know multiple truths in virtue of being in a single state, and there is in principle no upper limit to the number of truths the divine being could know in virtue of a single state.
“I will assume, as is required by these solutions, that a subject can know multiple truths in virtue of being in a single state, and that there is, in principle, no upper limit to the number of truths the divine being could know in virtue of a single state.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
God is omniscient.
“assuming that God is omniscient and there are contingent truths”
The authors state this as an assumption.
There are contingent truths.
“assuming that God is omniscient and there are contingent truths”
The paper relies on this without support.
The divine substance exists necessarily (NB).
“NB: The divine substance exists necessarily.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The divine substance is not composed in any way, and there are no entities intrinsic to God distinct from the divine substance (ST).
“ST: The divine substance is not composed in any way; nor are there entities intrinsic to God distinct from the divine substance.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Necessarily, God's knowing some truth T implies some entity intrinsic to God that would not exist were God not knowing T (KT).
“KT: Necessarily, God's knowing some truth T implies some entity intrinsic to God that would not exist were God not knowing T.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Intentional activity is inherently cognitional.
“A key assumption of the Agency Model, reflected in claim (n), is that intentional activity is inherently cognitional.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
If God can stand in the knowing relation to past and future objects and events, then these objects and events can also partially constitute and inform God's acts of knowing them, where these acts are understood as relations to these objects and events.
“37 I assume that, if God can stand in the knowing relation to past and future objects and events, then these objects and events can also partially constitute and inform God's acts of knowing them, where these acts are understood as relations to these objects and events.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The concrete universe is not made up of propositions.
“On the view currently standard, beliefs take propositions as their objects, but the concrete universe is not made up of propositions.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Section reference points to the wrong section
MinorThe discussion of rejecting (CK) and (NB) appears in Section 2, not Section 1 as the passage says.
“In the first section, I consider responses that reject (CK) and (NB), arguing that these responses are too costly, or that they leave significant problems unaddressed.”
“## 2. Problematic Solutions: Rejecting (CK) or (NB)”
Citations
Cites
Priest, G. (2003) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil200310054 · Cited by 99
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
An Anselmian Approach to Divine Simplicity
Rogers, K. A. (2020) · Faith and Philosophy · doi:10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.3.3 · Cited by 22
The aloneness argument against classical theism
Schmid, J. C., & Mullins, R. T. (2021) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412520000554 · Cited by 18
The fruitful death of modal collapse arguments
Schmid, J. C. (2021) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09804-z · Cited by 16
“For treatments, see Schmid and Mullins (2021), Grant (2012), Grant and Spencer (2015), and Moreland and Craig (2003, p. 525).”
BackgroundAnother Look at the Modal Collapse Argument
(2021) · doi:10.24204/ejpr.v13i1.3168 · Cited by 12
From Modal Collapse to Providential Collapse
Schmid, J. C. (2022) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-021-00438-z · Cited by 10
“See, e.g., Pruss (2008) and Grant (2012, 2019).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Grant, W. M., & The Society of Christian Philosophers
- Corresponding author
- Grant, W. Matthews
- ORCID
- Grant, W. Matthews
- Venue
- Faith and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Society of Christian Philosophers
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 254-274
- ISSN
- 0739-7046 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1967680842
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2016: 2 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 1.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Faith and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- ePlace - Preserving, Learning, and Creative Exchange (Asbury Theological Seminary) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Medieval Philosophy and Theology
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Karl Barth and Christian Theology
- Keywords
- divine simplicity, knowledge of God, divine attributes, metaphysics of God
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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