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Cited by 10Theology and Philosophy of EvilKarl Barth and Christian TheologyPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

From Modal Collapse to Providential Collapse

Schmid, Joseph C.·2022·Philosophia
DOI 10.1007/s11406-021-00438-z
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  • Schmid's statement that nothing in God's simple act distinctively favors a precise effect over another presupposes without justification that God needs contrasting reasons to act.

    “However, this statement presupposes without justification that God needs contrasting reasons to act.”

    From Aquinas on Providence, Control, and Divine Simplicity: The Providential Collapse of the Providential Collapse Argument (2025) · cites this paper as Schmid 2022, 11, footnote 14

  • If God is the creator, He needs to have control over whether He creates or not at all, and over the content of creation in terms of kinds of entities or particular individuals within the range allowed by communication of his goodness.

    “This means, as Schmid himself points out (2022, 9), that God needs to have control over whether He creates or not at all; and He also needs to be in control of the content of creation in terms of the kinds of entities-or even the particular individuals-that populate the universe, within the range of possibilities allowed by the communication of his goodness to creatures.”

    From Aquinas on Providence, Control, and Divine Simplicity: The Providential Collapse of the Providential Collapse Argument (2025) · cites this paper as Schmid 2022, 9

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Research works printed but not linked: 54

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  4. Broadie, A. (2010). Scotistic metaphysics and creation ex nihilo. In D. B. Burrell, J. M. Soskice, & W. R. Stoeger (Eds.), Creation and the God of Abraham (pp. 53–64). Cambridge University Press.
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Metadata

Authors
Schmid, J. C.
Affiliations
Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
Corresponding author
Schmid, Joseph C.
ORCID
Schmid, Joseph C.
Venue
Philosophia
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2022-01-10
Volume
50
Issue
3
Pages
1413-1435
ISSN
  • 0048-3893 (ISSN-L)
  • 1574-9274
DOI
10.1007/s11406-021-00438-z
OpenAlex
W4205928255
Cited by
10
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3
FWCI
7.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • Philosophia (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Karl Barth and Christian Theology
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
modal collapse, classical theism, divine foreknowledge, divine providence, divine action, divine foreknowledge and free will

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