Falsely, Sanely, Shallowly: Reflections on the Special Character of Grief
Open accessAbstract
Our reluctance to demystify grief is a sign of the distinctive obligation and discomfort that people feel towards those who have died. These feelings, however, are instructive about the nature of grief. As a vehicle of a living person’s relation to the dead, grief is mysterious—and we are rightly reluctant to take that mystery away. But grief is not to be avoided by philosophy on that account. I defend a less Romantic view of grief, in which a grieving person’s experience of “normal” grief: 1) is felt to require an objectively recognized loss; 2) is felt to be dedicated to that lost object; 3) seems to most people to be something that she ought to feel; and 4) probably ought not to be medicalized, nor consequently medicated. This view of grief affords an understanding and appreciation of this rather special and important emotion without reducing its mystery.
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Grief has significant cognitive content based on recognition of a specific loss and desire for a continued relationship with the loved one, and it is a moral emotion in the sense that a grieving person often thinks of themselves as morally bound to the memory of the loved one.
“Moreover, grief has a significant cognitive content in that it is based on the recognition of a specific loss and the desire for a continued relationship with the loved one (Gustafson, 1989;Ratcliffe, 2017).Also, it is a moral emotion in the sense that a grieving person often thinks of themselves as morally bound to the memory of the loved one (McCracken, 2005).”
From The effects of reading narrative fiction on social and moral cognition (2021) · cites this paper as McCracken, 2005
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Cited by 22
- Authors
- McCracken, J., & Philosophy Documentation Center
- Corresponding author
- McCracken, Janet
- Venue
- International Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2005
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 139-156
- ISSN
- 0739-098X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2158370599
- Cited by
- 22
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2017: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philpapers.org
- Locations
- International Journal of Applied Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Grief, Bereavement, and Mental Health
- Social Sciences › Anthropology › Death, Funerary Practices, and Mourning
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- grief, normal grief, loss, medicalization of grief, bereavement, Romanticism
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