The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome
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The Neural Basis of the Dynamic Unconscious
Berlin, H. A. (2011) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2011.10773654 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
Split-brain: what we know now and why this is important for understanding consciousness
de Haan, E. H. F., Corballis, P. M., Hillyard, S. A., Marzi, C. A., Seth, A., Lamme, V. A. F., Volz, L., Fabri, M., Schechter, E., Bayne, T., et al. (2020) · Neuropsychology Review · doi:10.1007/s11065-020-09439-3 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
“Here, we use the term in the sense of “subject unity” as defined by Bayne (Bayne & Chalmers, 2003; Bayne, 2008; Bayne, 2010).”
MethodSelf-citationRoelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.001.0001 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
Macpherson, F. (2011) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00317.x · Cited by 76 · see citing works
The octopus and the unity of consciousness
Carls-Diamante, S. (2017) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-017-9604-0 · Cited by 48 · see citing works
“Indeed, the octopus is an exemplar of an animal in which ‘‘the unity of consciousness might fail’’ (Bayne 2008: 300), thereby demonstrating that consciousness is not necessarily unified.”
BackgroundInfluentialMoore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey
Williams, J. N. (2015) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12188 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Wiest, M. C. (2025) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaf011 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
“The unity of consciousness has been comprehensively defended by Timothy Bayne and others (Cleeremans et al. 2000, Bayne 2008, 2010).”
Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: Part 1 (Neurobiological and cognitive models)
De Sousa, A. (2013) · Mens Sana Monographs · doi:10.4103/0973-1229.109335 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
“All that can be said at this stage is that the case against the unity of consciousness remains unproven (Bayne, 2008[17]; Mehta, 2011[145]).”
BackgroundBiophysics Of Consciousness: A Foundational Approach
Poznański, R. R., Tuszyński, J. A., & Feinberg, T. E. (2016) · doi:10.1142/9444#t=toc · Cited by 32 · see citing works
Where Is It Like to Be an Octopus?
Carls‐Diamante, S. (2022) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.840022 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
“It has long been assumed that the “normal” structure of consciousness is that it is unified, in that a conscious organism experiences a single conscious field at any given time (Bayne, 2008, 2010).”
BackgroundMoore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief
Williams, J. N. (2010) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01073.x · Cited by 28 · see citing works
“B (p & q) ↔ (B p & B q) C C C This is very plausible against the background of the ‘synchronic unity of consciousness’ (Bayne 2008; Bayne forthcoming; Tye 2003): all the conscious states you have at a given instant are unified into a single encompassing state.”
BackgroundGennaro, R. J. (2015) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.001.0001 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
A Unified Treatment of Moore's Paradox
Williams, J. N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198744221.001.0001 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Schechter, E. (2010) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00439.x · Cited by 23 · see citing works
“…the generally unified nature of split-brain subjects’ behaviour in terms of the fact that, outside of experimental situations, the two hemispheres will have largely overlapping sensory-perceptual access to the world (though see Bayne 2008 and Schechter 2010, for some scepticism on this point).”
BackgroundSplit-brain patients: Visual biases for faces
Prete, G., & Tommasi, L. (2018) · Progress in brain research · doi:10.1016/bs.pbr.2018.06.006 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Hemispherectomies and Independently Conscious Brain Regions
Blackmon, J. B. (2016) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Intentions and Unified Agency: Insights from the Split‐brain Phenomenon
Schechter, E. (2012) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12003 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
“For a critical survey of the dominant models of consciousness in split-brain subjects, see Bayne, 2008.”
BackgroundThe switch model of split-brain consciousness
Schechter, E. (2012) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2011.579417 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“(Bayne, 2008, p. 294) At present, the switch model is compatible with at least two different proposals about what it takes to ‘‘win’’ the interhemispheric competition for consciousness (see Kanwisher, 2001, for a related discussion).”
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Roelofs, L. (2017) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12169 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Consciousness after split-brain surgery: The recent challenge to the classical picture
Schechter, E., & Bayne, T. (2021) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2021.107987 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Self-citationSingularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution
de Haan, E. H. F., Scholte, H. S., Pinto, Y., Foschi, N., Polonara, G., & Fabri, M. (2021) · Journal of Neuropsychology · doi:10.1111/jnp.12234 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“Bayne (2008, 2010); Bayne andChalmers (2003) distinguish different definitions of unified consciousness, and in one sense, singularity refers to ’subject unity’.”
BackgroundColvin, M. K., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (2007) · Blackwell Publishing Ltd eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470751466.ch15 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
The Structure of Consciousness
(2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-585-34713-4_8 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Physical integration: A causal account for consciousness
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Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness
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“That is, a mental representation is phenomenally conscious because it is an element (or rather a modification) of the complex (or cluster) forming the single global representation or momentary ‘total state of consciousness’ (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003) of a subject interacting with her environment. On this view (as in K…”
BackgroundInfluentialSearching for the neural realizers of ownership unity
Welshon, R. (2012) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.713164 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“However, split-brain symptoms may instead be described as a kind of content disunity rather than ownership disunity (Bayne, 2008).”
BackgroundA DEFENSE OF THE NECESSARY UNITY OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS
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“biological organisms (Bayne, 2008)(6) that exhibit features which suggest, even slightly, that it houses multiple cognitive systems.”
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Meier, L. J. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03637-7 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Medically informed publications include Bayne (2008); Gillett (1986); Meier (2020b, pp. 116–119);Nagel (1985);Noonan (2003, p. 5 f.); Puccetti (1973, 1981); Schechter (2015);Wilkes (1999, pp. 132–167).”
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“It is contested whether these findings indicate a form of disunity of consciousness (Bayne, 2008) and, if so, whether they indicate disunity of phenomenal consciousness, as opposed to, for example, access-consciousness (Bayne & Chalmers, 2003).”
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“For instance, when having a multimodal experience one may also have an additional feeling of unity arising from the fact that different unimodal elements occur together within a single conscious episode (e.g., Bayne 2008; Macpherson 2011; Tye 2003).”
BackgroundMoore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief
Williams, J. N. (2011) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-011-0122-4 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“The synchronic unity of consciousness (Bayne 2008, 2010; Tye 2003) holds that (UC) You are fully conscious at t of A and fully conscious at t of B just in case you are fully conscious at t of A-and-B.”
BackgroundConsciousness as Presence: An Exploration of the Illusion of Self
Fink, C. K. (2013) · Buddhist Studies Review · doi:10.1558/bsrv.v30i1.113 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
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Williams, J. N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198744221.003.0003 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Problems with Unity of Consciousness Arguments for Substance Dualism
Bayne, T. (2018) · doi:10.1002/9781119468004.ch13 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Self-citationDoes consciousness even appear unified?
Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (2023) · Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift · doi:10.18261/nft.58.4.4 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Dijital Sonsuzluk Arayışı ve Kişisel Kimlik Problemi
Ganioğlu, K. G. (2024) · Felsefe Dünyası · doi:10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1489399 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Split brain syndrome: One brain but two conscious minds?
Agrawal, D., Chinara, P. K., Kumar, S., et al. (2014) · Journal of Health Research and Reviews · doi:10.4103/2394-2010.150793 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
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Moreland, J. P. (2018) · doi:10.1002/9781119468004.ch12 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
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“However, after a few weeks, complete restoration of coordination was observed [38–40].”
A layered unity model of split-brain consciousness
Lopez, A. (2025) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-025-02339-3 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Individuating Artificial Minds
McINTYRE, J. L. (2026) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-026-01097-w · Cited by 1 · see citing works
García, O. L. I. (2018) · Recerca Revista de pensament i anàlisi · doi:10.6035/recerca.2018.22.2 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
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"The Self-Simulation Theory: A Computational Theory of Consciousness"
Chakraborty, S. (2023) · Biomedical Journal of Scientific & Technical Research · doi:10.26717/bjstr.2023.48.007699 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Gottlieb, J., & Fischer, B. (2024) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2024.2370016 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
No disconnection syndrome after near-complete callosotomy
Bekir, S., Hopf, J. L., Paul, T., Wiemer, V. M., Santander, T., Skinner, H. E., Rada, A., Woermann, F., Kalbhenn, T., Giesbrecht, B., et al. (2025) · bioRxiv · doi:10.1038/s44271-025-00377-5 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
The Structure of Consciousness
Friesen, L. (2019) · doi:10.7275/5389-r721 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Bayne (2008, 2010) has offered, perhaps, the most significant defence of this view.”
BackgroundPhilosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science since 1980
Schier, E., & Sutton, J. D. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_20 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
On Bayne and Chalmers’ Phenomenal Unity Thesis (or: Much Ado about Nothing)
Duindam, G. (2019) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-019-00115-2 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“See Bayne 2010, 7. some ‘mind’, and nothing it’s-like to be the conjunction of those two things, then we are dealing with two distinct minds.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Phenomenal Quality of Complex Experiences
Fazekas, P. (2023) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-023-00676-y · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“The first major aim of the paper, thus, is to show that there is no extra phenomenal quality brought about by unifying simple constituents (contra e.g. Bayne 2008).”
Neuroética y neuroeducación: repensando la relación entre las neurociencias y las ciencias sociales
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The Self-Simulation Theory:A Computational Theory of ConsciousnessPreprint
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Moore-paradoxical Assertion and Fully Conscious Belief
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Split-brain Consciousness and the Phase Transition View
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Moore’s Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief: A Reply to Vahid
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Two Roads Less Travelled by Psychoanalysis
Christof Koch, A. (2011) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2011.10773660
“This is what philosophers refer to as the unity consciousness (Bayne, 2008).”
BackgroundSelfho od and the Unity of Consciousness
Hanniball, K. (2012) · Sound Ideas (University of Puget Sound)
Roxborough, C. L. (2016) · YorkSpace (York University)
Composite Subjectivity and Psychological Subjects
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0007
Composite Subjectivity in Organisms, Organs, and Organizations
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0006
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Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0004
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Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0001
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Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0008
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Emotion’s role in the unity of consciousness
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“(Bayne, 2008, p. 278) This experimental set up allegedly reveals two types of disunities in splitbrain patients, i.e. behavioral disunities and representational disunities (Bayne, 2008).”
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- Authors
- Bayne, T., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Bayne, Tim
- ORCID
- Bayne, Tim
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2008
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 277-300
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W111585348
- Cited by
- 112
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 4.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- unity of consciousness, split-brain syndrome, hemispheric disconnection, self-consciousness, mind-brain relationship, philosophy of mind
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