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Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle
Open accessAbstract
It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductive physicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties.
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Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference
Pearl, J. (2009) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803161 · Cited by 11,653
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Cited by
Quantifying causal emergence shows that macro can beat micro
Hoel, E. P., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1314922110 · Cited by 378
Wilson, A. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12190 · Cited by 267
Can the macro beat the micro? Integrated information across spatiotemporal scales
Hoel, E. P., Albantakis, L., Marshall, W., & Tononi, G. (2016) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niw012 · Cited by 140
Black-boxing and cause-effect power
Marshall, W., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2018) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006114 · Cited by 73
Metadata
- Authors
- List, C., Menzies, P., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2009
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 475-502
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2059679522
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 6.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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