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Extended Cognition and Functionalism

Open access
Sprevak, Mark, Journal of Philosophy, Inc.·2009·Journal of Philosophy

Abstract

Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that the mind sometimes extends outside the body to encompass features of the environment (HEC).HEC has been criticised by Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, and Robert Rupert.In this paper, I argue for two claims: (1) HEC is a harder target than those critics have supposed; HEC is entailed by functionalism, a commonly held view in philosophy of mind, and one to which those critics are already committed.(2) e version of HEC entailed by functionalism is more radical than the version that Clark and Chalmers suggest.I argue that this version of HEC is so radical as to form a counterexample to functionalism.e conclusion of the paper is against both HEC and functionalism.1. Clark and Chalmers (1998).2. Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2007); Rupert (2004). 1 1 HEC(2) give up HEC entirely.Clark and Chalmers' intermediate position of a modest form of HEC is unsustainable.e argument of this paper, although initially appearing to support Clark and Chalmers, ultimately argues against their position.e price of HEC is rampant expansion of the mind into the world, and the implausibility of such expansion is indicative of deep-seated problems with functionalism.e argument of this paper consequently speaks to wider issues than just the status of HEC. e reasons for HEC's failure bring to light new troubles with functionalism as an account of cognitive systems.In Sections 1-3, I give Clark and Chalmers' argument for HEC, Rupert, Adams and Aizawa's criticism, and my response.In Section 4, I argue that functionalism (of a minimal kind) entails HEC.In Section 5, I show that the modest version of HEC proposed by Clark and Chalmers is unsustainable.In Section 6, I analyse the features of functionalism responsible for generating radical HEC.In Section 7, I criticise the other main argument for HEC: that HEC should be accepted based on its explanatory value to cognitive science.I conclude that HEC, and the functionalism that supports it, should be rejected. HECClark and Chalmers introduce HEC with two thought experiments.e first thought experiment involves three ways of playing the computer game Tetris.In Tetris, the player rotates falling blocks to form complete horizontal rows which are then eliminated.Imagine:Sitting facing a computer screen and mentally rotating a block to judge whether it will fit the sockets below.t2 Sitting facing a computer screen and physically rotating the image on screen by pressing a rotate button to judge whether the block will fit the sockets below.t3 Choosing to perform the rotation using either old-fashioned mental rotation or a neural implant that quickly rotates one's mental image on demand.First, Clark and Chalmers argue that the implant version of T3 is just as much a cognitive process as T1: there seems no reason why an implant cannot count as cognitive merely because it is artificial, and one can imagine that the implant is as tightly integrated with the rest of the player's cognitive system as one likes.Second, they argue that T2 is just as much a cognitive process as T3.One can imagine that T2 and T3 have the same functional structure: the neural implant uses same algorithm for rotation as in T2, it is initiated in the same way (by motor cortex activity), and it produces output in a similar way (a retinal image).e difference is that in T2 the processing is spread between the agent and the computer, while in T3 all the processing takes place inside the agent.Since the question is whether cognitive processes can cross the skin/skull boundary, it would be questionbegging to object that T2 is not cognitive only because it does cross that boundary.Clark and Chalmers claim that T2 and T3 are otherwise alike.eir conclusion is that T2 and T3 have an equal claim to be cognitive.

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Metadata

Authors
Sprevak, M., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
Venue
Journal of Philosophy
Published
2009
Volume
106
Issue
9
Pages
503-527
ISSN
0022-362X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1509922667
Cited by
171
References
0
FWCI
3.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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Sprevak, M., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2009). Extended Cognition and Functionalism. Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2009106937

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