The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds
Abstract
Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this view was first expressed 20 years ago, and has received recent discussion and critique, it remains underdeveloped and is often misrepresented by its critics (section 8). When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028 · cited 1×
“The HPC view of natural kinds was introduced as part of an overarching realist view of science and ethics, a realism reinvigorated by developments in the theory of reference in the philosophy of language by Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975).”
Background
Cited by
What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders?
Kendler, K. S., Zachar, P., & Craver, C. (2011) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291710001844 · Cited by 617
Fried, E. I. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00309 · Cited by 367
Tryon, W. W. (2018) · Clinical Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2167702618765791 · Cited by 49
From cognition’s location to the epistemology of its nature
Barker, M. J. (2010) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.05.001 · Cited by 13
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Wilson, R. A., Barker, M. J., Brigandt, I., & University of Arkansas Press
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 189-215
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2323791054
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 31.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.