The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Tracing and the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
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“The concept of tracing tries to capture the basic intuition that a human agent may be responsible for an outcome even if she does not satisfy the conditions for responsibility in situ at the time of her action, provided that she was responsible at an earlier time for finding herself later in the position of not satisfying those conditions.”
From Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account (2018) · cites this paper as Timpe, 2011
Citations
Cites
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249
Elbow room: the varieties of free will worth wanting
(2016) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.194249 · Cited by 769
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x · Cited by 558
Feinberg, J. (1984) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 407
Moral Responsibility and Ignorance
Zimmerman, M. J. (1997) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233742 · Cited by 378
Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution
Guerrero, A. A. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9143-7 · Cited by 311
Schneider, H. W., & Ross, S. W. D. (1940) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2017823 · Cited by 250
van Inwagen, P. (1989) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214275 · Cited by 187
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE AIMS OF THEORY: STRAWSON AND REVISIONISM
Vargas, M. R. (2004) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.0279-0750.2004.00195.x · Cited by 98
Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility
McKenna, M. S. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9100-5 · Cited by 95
The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility
Ginet, C. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.14 · Cited by 84
Incompatibilism's Allure: Principal Arguments for Incompatibilism
Haji, I. (2008) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 75
Cited by
Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account
Santoni de Sio, F., & van den Hoven, J. (2018) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2018.00015 · Cited by 566
“The idea of tracing is often used by moral responsibility theorists and according to Manuel Vargas tracing “is one of a few things to which nearly all parties in the debate about free will [and moral responsibility] appeal to with equal enthusiasm” (Vargas, 2005 quoted by Timpe, 2011).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Timpe, K., & St. Louis University
- Venue
- The Modern Schoolman
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-28
- ISSN
- 0026-8402
- Cited by
- 23
- References
- 12
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