The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Abstract
This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism.
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In the citing paper
“From Aristotle to contemporary analytic moral philosophy (Aristotle 1984;Fischer and Ravizza 1998;McKenna 2008;Rudy-Hiller 2018), it has been held that there are at least two types of conditions for holding someone responsible and for exercising responsibility: humans need to be in control and know what we are doing.”
From Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence (2023) · cites this paper as Fischer and Ravizza 1998
In the citing paper
“Most conceptions of moral responsibility have a focus on three aspects in common: a causal connection between the agent and the event for which the agent might be responsible, the agent having sufficient knowledge of their decision situation, and a certain autonomy of the agent [26, 59, 82].”
From On the Quest for Effectiveness in Human Oversight: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2024) · cites this paper as [26]
In the citing paper
“According to Fischer and Ravizza’s second condition for guidance control, in order to be morally responsible for their actions, the decisional mechanism should also be an integral part of who the agent is. This means that the agent must have “taken responsibility” for that mechanism by which she decides.”
From Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account (2018) · cites this paper as Fischer and Ravizza, 1998
In the citing paper
““Taking responsibility” for one’s decisional mechanism requires that (a) the agent sees that her decisions have certain effects in the world; (b) the agent sees that others may have moral reactions toward her because of how she affects the world; and (c) the views specified in the first two conditions are based on the agent’s evidence in an appropriate way (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998: 207–239;”
From Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account (2018) · cites this paper as Fischer and Ravizza, 1998: 207–239
In the citing paper
““Taking responsibility” for one’s decisional mechanism requires that (a) the agent sees that her decisions have certain effects in the world; (b) the agent sees that others may have moral reactions toward her because of how she affects the world; and (c) the views specified in the first two conditions are based on the agent’s evidence in an appropriate way (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998: 207–239;”
From Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account (2018) · cites this paper as Fischer and Ravizza, 1998: 207–239
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Citations
Cited by
Kane, R. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 · Cited by 1,316
The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata
Matthias, A. (2004) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-004-3422-1 · Cited by 1,101
“For a person to be rightly held responsible, that is, in accordance with our sense of justice, she must have control over her behaviour and the resulting consequences ‘‘in a suitable sense’’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13).”
BackgroundFairness, Responsibility, and Welfare
Fleurbaey, M. (2008) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199215911.001.0001 · Cited by 690
Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account
Santoni de Sio, F., & van den Hoven, J. (2018) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2018.00015 · Cited by 566
Mele, A. R. (2003) · doi:10.1093/019515617x.001.0001 · Cited by 545
Metadata
- Authors
- Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Riverside (US)
- ORCID
- Fischer, John Martin
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1998-02-13
- OpenAlex
- W2044908625
- Semantic Scholar
- 94a275673cea896ac1393b8bf4118e32cc921183
- Cited by
- 2,249
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 148 · 2025: 213 · 2024: 124 · 2023: 118 · 2022: 102 · 2021: 114 · 2020: 96 · 2019: 115 · 2018: 109 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 91 · 2015: 100 · 2014: 55 · 2013: 86 · 2012: 80
- FWCI
- 5.81
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- moral responsibility, guidance control, omission, consequences, emotions, causal determinism, agency, free will
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511814594
- The paper
- Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511814594
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.