Realism about Moral Deference

When we hear testimony against interest, we are typically prima facie justified in believing it.

“When we hear such testimony, I think we are typically prima facie justified in believing it.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: In ordinary cases, beliefs based on testimony are epistemically innocent until proven guilty (Reidian non-reductionism).

We should largely discount the moral testimony of strangers, even if it is stipulated that they know what they assert.

“And this, in turn, explains why we should largely discount the moral testimony of strangers (even if it is stipulated that they know what they assert).”

In most examples used by optimists to motivate their view, deference is irrational because hearers have clear defeaters for the moral assertions made by their friends and allies.

“The upshot of this is that in most examples used by optimists to motivate their view, deference is irrational because hearers have clear defeaters for the moral assertions made by their friends and allies.”

In some cases, testimony against interest may transmit knowledge, just like ordinary non-moral testimony.

“And in some cases, testimony against interest may transmit knowledge, just like ordinary non-moral testimony.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The hearer knows the background and identity of the speaker in the testimony-against-interest cases.

Our personal belief preferences and other biases play a major role in determining whom we identify as friend-worthy and morally reliable.

“Instead, our personal belief preferences and other biases play a major role in determining whom we identify as friend-worthy (and, mutatis mutandis, morally reliable).”

The unreliability of deferring to friends, self-selected advisors, or in-group members holds for assertions employing both thin and thick moral concepts.

“This is true when it comes to assertions employing both thin moral concepts (”

Our selection of people to whom to defer is very likely to be biased by our own belief preferences.

“And our selection of people to whom to defer is very likely to be biased by our own belief preferences.”

The cases described are structurally analogous to those presented by optimists in support of pure moral deference to friends, allies, and exemplars.

“Thus, these cases are structurally analogous to those presented by optimists in support of pure moral deference to friends, allies, and exemplars.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The hearer knows the background and identity of the speaker in the testimony-against-interest cases.

Moral testimony is not epistemically on par with other forms of testimony.

“Moral testimony is not epistemically on par with other forms of testimony.”

Fileva's claim that deference is guilty until proven innocent is correct.

“Thus, Fileva's claim that deference is guilty until proven innocent is correct.”

• cites Fileva (2023)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Deferring to friends, self-selected advisors, or in-group members is not a reliable approach to belief formation for moral questions.

“Thus, if we want to know whether, say, Exxon-Mobil is evil or whether third-trimester abortion is wrong, deferring to our friends, self-selected advisors, or in-group members is not a reliable approach to belief formation.”

In interesting cases, where speakers make contested, controversial, or complicated moral claims, deference is typically irrational.

“Now, in interesting cases, where speakers make contested, controversial, or complicated moral claims (which often have a high political or personal valence), deference is typically irrational.”

Our in-groups are partly constituted by a shared set of stable moral commitments that members hold with high confidence, owing in part to systematic biases.

“Moreover, our in-groups are partly constituted by a shared set of stable moral commitments that members hold with high confidence, owing in part to the sorts of systematic biases discussed above.”

People are systematically biased about controversial non-Moorean moral claims and issues.

“This is because people are systematically biased about controversial non-Moorean moral claims and issues.”

• cites Huemer (2015, p.60)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Caplan (2008) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

In the Priest case, it does not appear inappropriate to defer to Brown.

“Thus, it doesn't appear inappropriate to defer to Brown.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The hearer knows the background and identity of the speaker in the testimony-against-interest cases.

The author's position upholds the asymmetry thesis.

“In conclusion, I should note that my position upholds the asymmetry thesis.”

It is rarely prudentially good for us to hold or express moral beliefs that deviate from the consensus within our in-groups.

“And it is rarely prudentially good for us to hold or express moral beliefs that deviate from the consensus within our in-groups.”

If someone asserts an interesting moral proposition that runs counter to what we know it would be instrumentally rational for them to believe, then deference is at least prima facie appropriate, even if one doesn't engage in further investigation.

“To summarize: If someone asserts an interesting moral proposition that runs counter to what we know it would be instrumentally rational for them to believe, then deference is at least prima facie appropriate, even if one doesn't engage in further investigation into the matter.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The hearer knows the background and identity of the speaker in the testimony-against-interest cases.

We should be realists about the epistemic bona fides of moral deference.

“Instead, we should be realists about the epistemic bona fides of moral deference.”

Our identification of allies, friends, and exemplars is subject to a selection effect.

“This is because our identification of allies, friends, and exemplars is subject to a selection effect.”

Interesting moral testimony from our friends, allies, and in-groups is highly likely to be biased due to rational irrationality.

“In any event, interesting moral testimony from our friends, allies, and in-groups is highly likely to be biased due to rational irrationality.”

The author rejects the optimists' claim that it is often appropriate to defer to friends, allies, experts, and exemplars.

“Thus, I reject the optimists' claim that it is often appropriate to defer to friends, allies, experts, and exemplars.”

In the cases described, the hearer has good reason to think that a standard undercutting defeater for deference-based moral beliefs is itself defeated.

“It's just that in the cases I've described, the hearer has good reason to think that a standard undercutting defeater for deference-based moral beliefs is itself defeated.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The hearer knows the background and identity of the speaker in the testimony-against-interest cases.

Deference to friends and allies is irrational.

“I defend realism by (i) arguing that deference to friends and allies is irrational and (ii) presenting three cases in which testimony against interest makes moral deference seem appropriate.”

Testimony against interest defeats the presumption of bias (and Fileva's presumption of guilt) that ordinarily accompanies moral testimony.

“I contend that testimony against interest defeats the presumption of bias (and, I think, Fileva's presumption of guilt) that ordinarily accompanies moral testimony (whether it comes from friends, foes, or whomever).”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The hearer knows the background and identity of the speaker in the testimony-against-interest cases.