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Veto bargaining: presidents and the politics of negative power
Abstract
The late-twentieth century has given rise to the most concentrated period of divided party government in American history. With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining offers a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
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Citations
Cited by
Veto Players and Institutional Analysis
Tsebelis, G. (2000) · Governance · doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00141 · Cited by 420
The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience
Groseclose, T., & McCarty, N. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669362 · Cited by 351
Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory
Moe, T. M., & Howell, W. G. (1999) · Presidential Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1741-5705.00070 · Cited by 224
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2001-03-01
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 07
- Pages
- 38-4145-38-4145
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W624759513
- Cited by
- 410
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Veto bargaining: presidents and the politics of negative power. (2001). Choice Reviews Online. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.38-4145
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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