The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Veto Players and Institutional Analysis
Abstract
The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one‐, two‐, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.
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Cites
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Shackle, G. L. S., & Arrow, K. J. (1951) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2549613 · Cited by 7,792
Tsebelis, G. (1995) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400007225 · Cited by 2,605
Self-citationPolitical Parties Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State
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The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter
Tsebelis, G. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944886 · Cited by 776
Self-citationVeto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis
Tsebelis, G. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585576 · Cited by 645
Self-citationThe Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96
Binder, S. A. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585572 · Cited by 621
Cited by
Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996
Davenport, C., & Armstrong, D. A. (2004) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00086.x · Cited by 652
Bringing political science back into public administration research
Peters, B. G., Pierre, J., Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2022) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12705 · Cited by 93
Legislative response to international terrorism
Epifanio, M. (2011) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343311399130 · Cited by 78
Metadata
- Authors
- Tsebelis, G.
- Venue
- Governance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 441-474
- ISSN
- 0952-1895 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0491
- OpenAlex
- W2131215460
- Cited by
- 420
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 92.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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