The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Encyclopedia of public choice
Abstract
Essays.- Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.- Public Choice: An Introduction.- Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct?.- Constitutional Political Economy.- Corruption.- Dictatorship.- Environmental Politics.- Experimental Public Choice.- Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation.- Interest Group Behavior and Influence.- International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade.- James M. Buchanan.- Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution.- Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior.- The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters.- Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics.- Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought.- Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law.- Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy.- Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology.- Public Finance.- Regulation and Antitrust.- Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson.- Shadow Economy.- Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling.- Spatial Theory.- Trade Liberalization and Globalization.- William H. Riker.- Concepts.- Academia.- Al-Qaeda.- Alternative Voting Methods.- Altruism.- The Anatomy of Political Representation.- Approval Voting.- Arbitration and Bargaining.- Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.- An 'Austrian' Perspective on Public Choice.- Autocracy.- Autocratic Succession.- Bicameralism.- Blackmail.- Black's Single-Peakedness Condition.- Budgetary Processes.- Budget Deficits.- Bureaucratic Discretion.- Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance.- Campaign Finance 1.- Campaign Finance 2.- Central Banks.- Chicago Political Economy.- The Clayton Act.- Coalitions and Power Indices.- Coalitions and Social Choice.- Coase Theorem and Political Markets.- Coercion.- Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation.- Committee Assignments.- Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions.- Committees in Legislatures.- Commons and Anticommons.- Constitution.- Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress.- The Constitution of the European Union.- Constitutional Political Economy.- The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy.- Contractarianism.- Corruption 1.- Corruption 2.- Cost and Choice.- The Cost Disease of the Personal Services.- Customary Law.- The Demand-Revealing Process.- Deregulation of Postal Service.- Dictators and Social Contracts.- Direct Democracy.- Discrimination.- Dynamic Inconsistency.- Economic Freedom and its Measurement.- Economic Freedom and Political Freedom.- Economic Regulation.- The Economic Theory of Clubs.- Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy.- Education and the State.- Efficiency of Democracy.- Efficiency of Democracy?.- The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis.- Elected Versus Appointed Regulators.- Election Models.- Electoral College.- Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation.- The Elusive Median Voter.- Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle.- Endogenous Morality.- Enron.- Environmental Politics and Economic Development.- The Euro.- European Political Integration.- Evolution of Institutions.- The Evolution of Law.- Experimental Economics and Public Choice.- Experimental Public Choice.- Expressive Voting and Redistribution.- Fair Division.- Fame and Politics.- Federal Reserve System.- Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States.- Game Theory.- Game Theory in Public Choice.- Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making.- Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition.- Growth of Local Government in the United States.- The Growth of Public Expenditure.- The Growth of the Relative Size of Government.- Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution.- Homo Economicus.- Human Evolution and Political Behavior.- Ideology.- The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics.- Initiative and Referendum.- Institutions of Trade Protection.- Interest Groups 1.- Interest Groups 2.- International Game of Power.- International Organization.- Internet Voting.- Is Russia a Market Economy?.- Is Voting Rational?.- The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice.- The Judiciary.- The Law and Economics Movement.- Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion.- Legal Rules and Standards.- Legislative Politics.- Legislators.- Leviathan Models of Government.- Logic of Collective Action.- The Logic of Liberty.- Logrolling 1.- Logrolling 2.- Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown.- The Median in Politics.- The Median Voter Model.- Medieval Church.- Mercantilism.- Monetary Politics.- The New Deal.- Nonprofit Organizations.- The Origins of Social Choice Theory.- The Paradox of Rebellion.- Parchment Versus Guns.- Political and Cultural Nationalism.- Political Business Cycles.- Political Economics and Public Choice.- The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments.- The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform.- Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation.- Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters.- Principal-Ag
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Shadow economies around the world: what do we really know?
Schneider, F. (2005) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.10.002 · Cited by 1,055
THE AID EFFECTIVENESS LITERATURE: THE SAD RESULTS OF 40 YEARS OF RESEARCH
Doucouliagos, H., & Paldam, M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2008.00568.x · Cited by 527
DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF
Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2011) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01033.x · Cited by 497
After the “Master Theory”: Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis
Hacker, J. S., & Pierson, P. (2014) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592714001637 · Cited by 430
KUNG, J. K.-S., & CHEN, S. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000626 · Cited by 298
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2004-06-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 41-5661-41-5661
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1599051804
- Cited by
- 381
- References
- 7
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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