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Cited by 497

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF

Open access
Egorov, Georgy, Sonin, Konstantin·2011·Journal of the European Economic Association

Abstract

The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those which are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator's own survival. We endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal-agent game between a dictator and his viziers in both static and dynamic settings. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face.

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Metadata

Authors
Egorov, G., & Sonin, K.
Venue
Journal of the European Economic Association
Published
2011-08-30
Volume
9
Issue
5
Pages
903-930
ISSN
1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3126103898
Cited by
497
References
5
FWCI
19.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01033.x
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Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2011). DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01033.x

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