The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF
Open accessAbstract
The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those which are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator's own survival. We endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal-agent game between a dictator and his viziers in both static and dynamic settings. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face.
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Cites
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 5×
“In this paper, we focus on the internal structure of the most personalized dictatorships, especially those that have exhibited strikingly poor governance (for the most recent examples, see, for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Haber 2005; Linz and Stepan 1978). Why do dictators, who presumably fear that poor ec…”
BackgroundInfluentialDemocracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962769 · Cited by 430
Cited by
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990219 · Cited by 546
Self-citationStrongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict
WEEKS, J. L. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000111 · Cited by 513
Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden
Besley, T., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160080 · Cited by 480
Corrupting the Cyber-Commons: Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability
Gunitsky, S. (2015) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592714003120 · Cited by 465
KUNG, J. K.-S., & CHEN, S. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000626 · Cited by 298
Metadata
- Authors
- Egorov, G., & Sonin, K.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-08-30
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 903-930
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3126103898
- Cited by
- 497
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 19.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2011). DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01033.x
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