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Sentimental rules: on the natural foundations of moral judgment
Abstract
Sentimental Rules is an ambitious and highly interdisciplinary work, which proposes and defends a new theory about the nature and evolution of moral judgment. In it, philosopher Shaun Nichols develops the theory that emotions play a critical role in both the psychological and the cultural underpinnings of basic moral judgment. Nichols argues that our norms prohibiting the harming of others are fundamentally associated with our emotional responses to those harms, and that such sentimental rules enjoy an advantage in cultural evolution, which partly explains the success of certain moral norms. This has sweeping and exciting implications for philosophical ethics. Nichols builds on an explosion of recent intriguing experimental work in psychology on our capacity for moral judgment and shows how this empirical work has broad import for enduring philosophical problems. The result is an account that illuminates fundamental questions about the character of moral emotions and the role of sentiment and reason in how we make our moral judgments. This work should appeal widely across philosophy and the other disciplines that comprise cognitive science.
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Cited by
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Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231
Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality
Tomasello, M., & Vaish, A. (2013) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812 · Cited by 916
Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future
Mikhail, J. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.12.007 · Cited by 887
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Blair, R. J. R. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.07.003 · Cited by 742
A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 668
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2005-09-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 43-0241-43-0241
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1987790928
- Cited by
- 557
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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