Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Open accessAbstract
Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.
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A reliance on more analytic (System 2) cognitive processes is associated with a tendency to make consequentialist moral judgments.
“There are reasons to suspect that this relationship may be attributable to differences in ACS, because a reliance on more analytic (System 2) cognitive processes is associated with a tendency to make consequentialist moral judgments [57, 60–63].”
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- Authors
- Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Greene, Joshua D.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-06
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1144-1154
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC2429958
- OpenAlex
- W2141233322
- Cited by
- 1,231
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 79 · 2023: 91 · 2022: 91 · 2021: 99 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 111 · 2018: 62 · 2017: 83 · 2016: 62 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 70 · 2013: 70 · 2012: 54
- FWCI
- 18.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- europepmc.org
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- National Institute of Mental Health (MH067410, F32MH067410)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- utilitarian moral judgment, cognitive load, dual-process theory, moral development, automatic processing, interference effects
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Cognition, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Morals, Reaction Time
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