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The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

·2006·Choice Reviews Online

Abstract

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. This accessible and original monograph explores a central aspect of the imagination, the creation of counterfactual alternatives to reality, and claims that imaginative thoughts are guided by the same principles that underlie rational thoughts. Research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed; in The Rational Imagination, Ruth Byrne argues that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People often create alternatives to reality and imagine how events might have turned out if only something had been different. Byrne explores the fault lines of reality, the aspects of reality that are more readily changed in imaginative thoughts. She finds that our tendencies to imagine alternatives to actions, controllable events, socially unacceptable actions, causal and enabling relations, and events that come last in a temporal sequence provide clues to the cognitive processes upon which the counterfactual imagination depends. The explanation of these processes, Byrne argues, rests on the idea that imaginative thought and rational thought have much in common.

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Metadata

Venue
Choice Reviews Online
Published
2006-01-01
Volume
43
Issue
05
Pages
43-2737-43-2737
ISSN
  • 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
  • 1523-8253
OpenAlex
W1555731215
Cited by
602
References
0
Type
book review
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5860/choice.43-2737
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The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality. (2006). Choice Reviews Online. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.43-2737

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.