The DOI matches its Crossref record; 161 of the 161 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Person as scientist, person as moralist
Open accessAbstract
It has often been suggested that people's ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people's moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance error, etc.) then interferes and allows people's moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. I argue that the data available now favor the second of these approaches over the first.
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Cites
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Icard, T. F., Kominsky, J. F., & Knobe, J. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.010 · Cited by 155
Self-citationConviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty
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Almeida, G. F. C. F., Nunes, J. L., Engelmann, N., Wiegmann, A., & Araújo, M. D. (2024) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2024.104145 · Cited by 70
Metadata
- Authors
- Knobe, J.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2010-08
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 315-329
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2148224179
- Cited by
- 375
- References
- 161
- FWCI
- 12.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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