The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Organization at the limit: lessons from the Columbia disaster
Abstract
Notes on contributors. Foreword: Sean O'Keefe. Part I: Introduction. 1 Introduction: Organizational Aspects of the Columbia Disaster: Moshe Farjoun and William H. Starbuck (New York University). Part II: The Context of the Disaster. 2 History and Policy in the Space Shuttle Program: Moshe Farjoun (New York University). 3 System Effects: On Slippery Slopes, Repeating Negative Patterns, and Learning from Mistake? Diane Vaughan (Boston College). 4 Organizational Learning and Action in the Midst of Safety Drift: Revisiting the Space Shuttle Program's Recent History: Moshe Farjoun (New York University). 5 The Space Between in Space Transportation: A Relational Analysis of the Failure of STS-107: Karlene H. Roberts, Peter M. Madsen, Vinit M. Desai (University of California - Berkley). Part III: Influences on decision making. 6 The Opacity of Risk: Language and the Culture of Safety in NASA's Space Shuttle Program: Willie Ocasio (Northwestern University). 7 Coping with Temporal Uncertainty: When Rigid, Ambitious Deadlines Don't Make Sense: Sally Blount (New York University), Mary Waller (Tulane University), and Sophie Leroy (New York University). 8 Attention to Production Schedule and Safety as Determinants of Risk-Taking in NASA's Decision to Launch the Columbia Shuttle: Angela Buljan (University of Zagreb) and Zur Shapira (New York University). Part IV: The Imaging Debate. 9 Making Sense of Blurred Images: Mindful Organizing in Mission STS-107: Karl Weick (University of Michigan). 10 The Price of Progress: Structurally Induced Inaction: Scott A. Snook and Jeffrey C. Connor (Harvard University). 11 Data Indeterminacy: One NASA, Two Modes: Raghu Garud and Roger Dunbar (New York University). 12 The Recovery Window: Organizational Learning Following Ambiguous Threats: Amy C. Edmondson, Michael A. Roberto, Richard M.J. Bohmer, Erika M. Ferlins, Laura R. Feldman (Harvard University). 13 Barriers to the Interpretation and Diffusion of Information about Potential Problems in Organizations: Lessons from the Space Shuttle Columbia: Frances Milliken, Theresa K. Lant, and Ebony Bridwell-Mitchell (New York University). Part V: Beyond Explanation. 14 Systems Approaches to Safety: NASA and the Space Shuttle Disasters: Nancy Leveson, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, John S. Carroll, Betty Barrett, Alexander Brown, Nicolas Dulac, Lydia Fraile, and Karen Marais (MIT). 15 Creating Foresight: Lessons for Enhancing Resilience from Columbia: David Woods (Ohio State). 16 Making NASA More Effective: William H. Starbuck (New York University) and Johnny Stevenson (NASA). 17 Observations on the Columbia Accident: Henry McDonald (University of Tennessee). Part VI: Conclusion. 18 Conclusion: Moshe Farjoun and William H. Starbuck (New York University). Index
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Digital Twin: Mitigating Unpredictable, Undesirable Emergent Behavior in Complex Systems
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Mindfulness and the Quality of Organizational Attention
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Cornelissen, J., & Werner, M. (2014) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2014.875669 · Cited by 836
Short on Time: Intertemporal Tensions in Business Sustainability
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Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2006-01-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 05
- Pages
- 43-2824-43-2824
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W567063555
- Cited by
- 326
- References
- 11
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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