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Why cooperate?: the incentive to supply global public goods

·2008·Choice Reviews Online

Abstract

Foreword by Ernesto Zedillo Introduction: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods 1. Single Best Efforts: Global Public Goods that Can Be Supplied Unilaterally or Minilaterally 2. Weakest Links: Global Public Goods that Depend on the States that Contribute the Least 3. Aggregate Efforts: Global Public Goods that Depend on the Combined Efforts of All States 4. Financing and Burden Sharing: Paying for Global Public Goods 5. Mutual Restraint: Agreeing What States Ought Not to Do 6. Coordination and Global Standards: Agreeing What States Ought to Do 7. Development: Do Global Public Goods Help Poor States? Conclusions: Institutions for the Supply of Global Public Goods Afterword

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Metadata

Venue
Choice Reviews Online
Published
2008-06-01
Volume
45
Issue
10
Pages
45-5821-45-5821
ISSN
  • 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
  • 1523-8253
OpenAlex
W1606127083
Cited by
391
References
0
Type
book review
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why cooperate?: the incentive to supply global public goods. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5860/choice.45-5821
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Why cooperate?: the incentive to supply global public goods. (2008). Choice Reviews Online. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.45-5821

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.