The DOI matches its Crossref record; 153 of the 153 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corruption, inequality, and the rule of law: the bulging pocket makes the easy life
Abstract
Corruption flouts rules of fairness and gives some people advantages that others don't have. Corruption is persistent; there is little evidence that countries can escape the curse of corruption easily - or at all. Instead of focusing on institutional reform, in this book Eric M. Uslaner suggests that the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality, low levels of generalized trust (which are not readily changed), and poor policy choices (which may be more likely to change). Economic inequality provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption, which, in turn, leads to further inequalities. Just as corruption is persistent, inequality and trust do not change much over time, according to Uslaner's cross-national aggregate analyses. He argues that high inequality leads to low trust and high corruption, and then to more inequality - an inequality trap - and identifies direct linkages between inequality and trust in surveys of the mass public and elites in transition countries.
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Cites
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Regulatory Burden, Rule of Law, and Entry of Strategic Entrepreneurs: An International Panel Study
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Quality of Government: What You Get
Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., & Nasiritousi, N. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100608-104510 · Cited by 352
Anti-corruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach
Rothstein, B. (2011) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692291003607834 · Cited by 351
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Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2009-02-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 06
- Pages
- 46-3495-46-3495
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1708527594
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 153
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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