The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Radicalizing enactivism: basic minds without content
Abstract
The vast sea of what humans do and experience is best understood by appeal to nothing more than dynamically unfolding, situated embodied interactions and engagements with worldly offerings. Basic mentality is neither underwritten by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor is it, it itself, inherently contentful. To think otherwise is to ascribe features and characteristics to basic minds that only belong to enculturated, scaffolded minds that are built atop them. This book advances this view by radicalizing enactivism. Enactive or embodied approaches to cognition give explanatory pride of place to dynamic interactions between organisms and features of their environments over the contentful representation of such environmental features. Radically Enactive or Embodied Cognition, REC, goes further than its conservative cousins by denying that even basic Cognition necessarily Involves Content, by denying CIC. Defenders of CIC must face up to the Hard Problem of Content. Posting informational content, it is argued, is not compatible with explanatory naturalism. This motivates the view that engaged interactions with environmental offerings involves being sensitive to covariant information but it does not involve literally picking up and processing informational contents. The same verdict applies to perceptual experiences. Even maximally minimal intellectualist proposals offer no compelling reason for supposing that perceptual experience is inherently contentful. Radicalizing Enactivism concludes by examining the consequences of adopting REC about basic minds for debates about how far minds extend and how we might best understand phenomenal aspects of experience.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Toward a second-person neuroscience
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & Vogeley, K. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000660 · Cited by 1,510
Ramstead, M. J. D., Veissière, S. P. L., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01090 · Cited by 422
Seth, A. K. (2014) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2013.877880 · Cited by 346
Scaffoldings of the affective mind
Colombetti, G., & Krueger, J. (2015) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.976334 · Cited by 356
Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism
Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9484-6 · Cited by 278
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2013-07-01
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 50-6104-50-6104
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1587803446
- Cited by
- 691
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Radicalizing enactivism: basic minds without content. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5860/choice.50-6104
- The paper
- Radicalizing enactivism: basic minds without content. (2013). Choice Reviews Online. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.50-6104
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.