The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 15 are not checked yet.
Module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism standard
Open accessAbstract
A key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is a set of algorithms that, under certain conditions, can be used by two parties to establish a shared secret key over a public channel. A shared secret key that is securely established using a KEM can then be used with symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms to perform basic tasks in secure communications, such as encryption and authentication. This standard specifies a key-encapsulation mechanism called ML-KEM. The security of ML-KEM is related to the computational difficulty of the Module Learning with Errors problem. At present,ML-KEM is believed to be secure, even against adversaries who possess a quantum computer. This standard specifies three parameter sets for ML-KEM. In order of increasing security strength and decreasing performance, these are ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024.
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“The security of ML-KEM is based primarily on the presumed hardness of certain computational problems in lattices.”
From Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
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“In the third round of the PQC Standardization Process, NIST selected one KEM -Kyber -that was then standardized as ML-KEM in FIPS 203 [14].”
From Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
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“NIST finalized three post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, a latticebased digital signature algorithm), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, a stateless hash-based signature standard).[36], [37], [38]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [36]
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Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Chen L (2022) Recommendation for key derivation using pseudorandom functions, (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-108r1-upd1, Includes updates as of February 2, 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP. 800-108r1-upd1. · DOI
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Sorted by citations
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Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process
Alagic, G., Bros, M., Ciadoux, P., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., et al. (2025) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8545 · Cited by 211
Security Guidelines for Implementing Homomorphic Encryption
Bossuat, J.-P., Cammarota, R., Chillotti, I., Curtis, B. R., Dai, W., Gong, H., Hales, E., Kim, D., Kumara, B., Lee, C., et al. (2025) · IACR Communications in Cryptology · doi:10.62056/anxra69p1 · Cited by 63
Anonymous, Zalcman, A., Gidney, C., Broughton, M., Khattar, T., Neven, H., Bergamaschi, T., Drake, J., & Boneh, D. (2026) · PRX Quantum · doi:10.1103/j3xf-bw18 · Cited by 58
Toward 6G Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol: A Survey on Hybrid Post Quantum Cryptography
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Metadata
- Authors
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)
- Published
- 2024-08-13
- OpenAlex
- W4401459825
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 184 · 2025: 76 · 2024: 8
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI), the national research institute for mathematics and computer science in the Netherlands (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
- Keywords
- key encapsulation mechanism, ML-KEM, module lattices, module learning with errors, post-quantum cryptography, key establishment, shared secret key, lattice-based cryptography, parameter sets
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