Cited by 464Cryptographic Implementations and SecurityCoding theory and cryptographyCryptography and Data Security

The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 11 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation :

Open access
Dworkin, M J·2007

Abstract

Reports on Information Security TechnologyThe Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure.ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology.ITL's responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, administrative, and management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive unclassified information in Federal computer systems.This Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately.Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

NIST Special Publication 800-38D specifies Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), an authenticated encryption mode constructed from an approved 128-bit block cipher such as AES, together with its authentication-only specialization GMAC. It defines the algorithms, the critical IV/key uniqueness requirement, and constraints on tag lengths and invocation counts.

Key findings

  • GCM combines confidentiality via a variant of Counter mode with authenticity via GHASH, a universal hash over a binary Galois field; input limits are len(P) ≤ 2³⁹−256 bits, len(A) ≤ 2⁶⁴−1 bits, and 1 ≤ len(IV) ≤ 2⁶⁴−1 bits, with all lengths required to be multiples of 8.
  • Supported tag lengths are 128, 120, 112, 104, or 96 bits in general; 64- and 32-bit tags are permitted only under Appendix C constraints. For 32-bit tags, a maximum combined ciphertext+AAD of 2⁵ bytes allows 2²² invocations, down to 2¹⁰ bytes allowing 2¹¹ invocations; for 64-bit tags, 2¹⁵ bytes allows 2³² invocations, down to 2²⁵ bytes allowing 2¹⁷ invocations.
  • The IV uniqueness requirement states the probability that the authenticated encryption function is ever invoked with the same IV and key on two or more distinct input sets shall be no greater than 2⁻³²; a single repeated IV may expose the implementation to forgery attacks (Joux), and the document says this requirement is "almost as important as the secrecy of the key."
  • Unless an implementation uses only 96-bit IVs from the deterministic construction, total invocations of authenticated encryption shall not exceed 2³² across all IV lengths and instances with a given key; a reasonable overall limit of 2⁶⁴ blocks of plaintext and AAD per key is suggested.

Methods

  • This is a standards specification, not an empirical study: it defines Algorithms 1–5 (block multiplication over GF(2¹²⁸), GHASH, GCTR, GCM authenticated encryption, and GCM authenticated decryption), with inputs, outputs, steps, diagrams, and summaries.
  • It specifies requirements for the underlying block cipher (approved, 128-bit block size, key ≥128 bits, fresh and secret), two IV construction frameworks (deterministic and RBG-based), key establishment, and conformance categories (GCM and GMAC).
  • No data, sample, or statistical analysis is reported; the document is normative guidance with appendices summarizing security rationale and short-tag constraints.

Limitations

  • Stated: authentication assurance is "strong, but not absolute" — a targeted ciphertext forgery is expected to succeed with probability approximately n/2ᵗ, where n is the total number of blocks in the GHASH encoding of ciphertext and AAD, so GCM is "not well-suited for use with short tag lengths or very long messages," and each successful forgery increases the probability of subsequent ones and leaks information about the hash subkey H.
  • Stated: GCM does not inherently prevent replay of a valid authenticated-encryption output; the controlling protocol must monitor IV duplication or incorporate identifying information (e.g., sequence numbers, timestamps) into the AAD.
  • Stated: the simplified GHASH in this Recommendation does not obtain all of the properties shown for the designers' definition of GHASH in Ref. [7]; also, security assurance degrades as more data is processed with a single key.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d

Cites

8 of 8 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

45 Own interpretation · 11 Sources not found · 10 No basis given

Show all 32 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 30
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 7
34 of 34
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The underlying approved block cipher is secure.

    “GCM is constructed from an approved symmetric key block cipher with a block size of 128 bits, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm that is specified in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Pub.197 [2].”
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Citations

Cites

Show all 8 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. IEEE P1619.1™/D23, Draft Standard for Authenticated Encryption with Length Expansion for Storage Devices.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Dworkin, M. J.
Published
2007
OpenAlex
W2727655671
Cited by
463
References
8
Citations by year
2026: 80 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 15
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Licence
public-domain
Funders
  • Government of Canada
  • National Institute of Standards and Technology
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
block cipher, modes of operation, cryptographic standards, block cipher modes of operation

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