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Our Interconnected, Resilient, Modern World ... Is Still Painfully and Remarkably Brittle: A Case Study of the Risks of Technology Failures

Witman, Paul, Prior, Jim · 2026 · Information Systems Education Journal

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 42 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

8.5 million Windows PCs failed to restart in July of 2024. CrowdStrike, an IT security company, delivered updates with a faulty configuration file to millions of Windows PCs around the world. The failure disrupted or halted the global operations of airlines, banks, medical facilities, and much more. Many PCs were unable to reboot without direct human intervention. This resulted in delays that impacted the recovery time for all types of businesses, as well as their employees, supply chains, and consumers. The paper also provides several other failure scenarios for student analysis, including cyber-attacks on health care and government, and a broader system failure in air traffic control, as well as a detailed background in the underlying principles of technological resilience. This teaching case for undergraduate and graduate information systems courses encourages students to examine key questions for each event: What went wrong, what was the root cause, and why didn't we see this failure coming? What can we learn from each case that might help technology leaders and their business counterparts to further mitigate the risk of any similar events?

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This teaching case uses the July 2024 CrowdStrike outage and three other technology-failure scenarios (Newark air traffic control, Baltimore ransomware, Change Healthcare cyberattack) to illustrate system resilience, brittleness, and risk-management concepts for information systems students. It pairs conceptual background with discussion questions and follow-on research prompts rather than presenting original empirical findings.

Key findings

  • The CrowdStrike faulty configuration update caused 8.5 million Windows PCs to crash and required manual intervention to recover; Delta alone reported costs over USD 500 million, and the airline industry suffered "many billions of dollars" in damages.
  • The Newark TRACON outage lasted 90 seconds (no radio, no radar); over 65 flights were diverted, 160 canceled, and 424 delayed, with the next day seeing more than 370 delayed and more than 500 canceled; the FAA later cut Newark departures/arrivals per hour by 50%.
  • Baltimore's 2019 ransomware attack involved a $76,000 ransom demand (refused) but over $18 million in recovery costs, with systems held hostage over five weeks and only 70% of employees back on email by day 36.
  • The Change Healthcare attack (detected February 21, 2024, begun February 12) involved a $22 million ransom, an estimated $2.87 billion cost to UnitedHealth Group in 2024, a $100 million per-day industry impact, ~$9 billion in provider loans, and a breach ultimately estimated to affect ~190 million people.

Methods

  • Design: a teaching case for undergraduate and graduate introductory information systems courses, structured as a hook, learning objectives, technical background (Section 2), four scenarios with discussion questions (Section 3), additional research prompts (Section 4), and conclusions.
  • Data/sample: no primary data collection; the case draws on secondary news and industry sources (e.g., CBS News, NPR, Reuters, Ars Technica, FAA statements) and prior literature to describe the CrowdStrike, Newark, Baltimore, and Change Healthcare events, plus Heathrow and Waymo examples.
  • Analysis: conceptual exposition of resilience, brittleness, complexity (Baccarini's organizational/technological distinction), resilience testing, cloud services, pervasive client software, automated updates, root cause analysis, and risk management (avoidance, transfer, reduction, acceptance).

Limitations

  • Not stated in the paper: the authors do not include a formal limitations section.
  • Evident from the text: the case relies on secondary sources (news reports, vendor blogs, FAA statements) rather than independent verification, and it presents no empirical evaluation of student learning outcomes or of the case's pedagogical effectiveness.
  • Evident from the text: several scenarios are described as ongoing or evolving (e.g., Change Healthcare data-leak status "as of June 2025," FAA upgrades "slow-going"), so figures and conditions may be superseded.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.62273/psas2989

Cites

8 of 8 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

2 Valid · 9 Not valid · 40 Not checked · 27 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Hatton, R. (2024). How has the Change Healthcare cyberattack affected physicians? Becker's ASC Review . Retrieved June 28, 2025, from https://www.beckersasc.com/ascnews/how-has-the-change-healthcarecyberattack-affected-physicians/
  2. Mathews, R. (2025). The Kelly Review: Lessons from Heathrow's power outage . https://www.thebci.org/news/the-kellyreview-lessons-from-heathrow-s-poweroutage.html

Metadata

Authors
Witman, P., & Prior, J.
Venue
Information Systems Education Journal
Published
2026
Volume
24
Issue
2
Pages
16-26
ISSN
1545-679X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7139977385
Cited by
0
References
8
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Information Systems Education Journal (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Supply Chain Resilience and Risk Management
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
Keywords
technology failure, system resilience, interconnected systems, risk, system fragility, information systems

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The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-07, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-07 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.