Cited by 19Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in ComputingTopic Modeling

Tricking llms into disobedience: Formalizing, analyzing, and detecting jailbreaks

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Rao, Abhinav, Vashistha, Sachin, Naik, Atharva, Aditya, Somak, Choudhury, Monojit·2024·Proceedings of the Language Resources and Evaluation Conference

Abstract

Recent explorations with commercial Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown that non-expert users can jailbreak LLMs by simply manipulating their prompts; resulting in degenerate output behavior, privacy and security breaches, offensive outputs, and violations of content regulator policies.Limited studies have been conducted to formalize and analyze these attacks and their mitigations.We bridge this gap by proposing a formalism and a taxonomy of known (and possible) jailbreaks.We survey existing jailbreak methods and their effectiveness on open-source and commercial LLMs (such as GPT-based models, OPT, BLOOM, and FLAN-T5-XXL).We further discuss the challenges of jailbreak detection in terms of their effectiveness against known attacks.For further analysis, we release a dataset of model outputs across 3700 jailbreak prompts over 4 tasks.

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  • The hypothesis that episodic memories could lead to unpredictable and undesirable behavior has a strong parallel in existing work on the effects of examples given to large language models.

    “Our hypothesis that episodic memories could be recalled and used in ways which lead to unpredictable and potentially undesirable agent behavior has a strong parallel in existing work on the effects of examples given to large language models.”
  • Few-shot in-context learning presents opportunities to undermine or defeat elements of large language models' training meant to keep them aligned to particular values such as being harmless.

    “Several research groups have demonstrated that such few-shot in context learning presents opportunities to undermine or defeat elements of the models' training which are meant to keep them aligned to particular values such as being harmless [98], [99].”

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Rao, A., Vashistha, S., Naik, A., Aditya, S., & Choudhury, M.
Venue
Proceedings of the Language Resources and Evaluation Conference
Published
2024-05
Pages
16802-16830
ISSN
2522-2686
OpenAlex
W7131890740
Cited by
19
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 1
FWCI
5.32
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Language Resources and Evaluation Conference (LREC) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Topic Modeling
Keywords
jailbreaking, large language models, jailbreak detection, prompt engineering, AI safety

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