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Outside Director Liability
Open accessAbstract
This Article analyzes the degree to which outside directors of public companies are exposed to out-of-pocket liability risk - the risk of paying legal expenses or damages pursuant to a judgment or settlement agreement that are not fully paid by the company or another source, or covered by directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance. Recent settlements in securities class actions involving WorldCom and Enron, in which lead plaintiffs succeeded in extracting out-of-pocket payments from outside directors, have led to predictions that such payments will become common. We analyze the out-of-pocket liability risk facing outside directors empirically, legally, and conceptually and show that this risk is very low, far lower than many commentators and board members believe, notwithstanding the WorldCom and Enron settlements. Our extensive search for instances in which outside directors of public companies have made out-of-pocket payments turned up thirteen cases in the last twenty-five years. Most involve fact patterns that should not recur today for a company with a state-of-the-art D&O insurance policy.We offer a detailed assessment of the liability risk outside directors face in trials under corporate and securities law, including settlement dynamics. We argue that, going forward, if a company has a D&O policy with appropriate coverage and sensible limits, outside directors will be potentially vulnerable to out-of-pocket liability only when (1) the company is insolvent and the expected damage award exceeds those limits, (2) the case includes a substantial claim under section 11 of the Securities Act or an unusually strong section 10(b) claim, and (3) there is an alignment between outside directors' or other defendants' culpability and their wealth. Absent facts that fit or approach this perfect-storm scenario, directors with state-of-the-art insurance policies face little out-of-pocket liability risk, and even in a perfect storm they may not face out-of-pocket liability. The principal threats to outside directors who perform poorly are the time, aggravation, and potential harm to reputation that a lawsuit can entail, not direct financial loss.A companion article, Brian Cheffins & Bernard Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 Texas Law Review 1385-1480 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=438321, studies six comparison common-law and civil-law countries (Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan). This article and Outside Director Liability Across Countries are the most fully developed of our articles on outside director liability.Earlier pieces of this overall project are listed below.http://ssrn.com/abstract=382422 (a pre-Enron and WorldCom version of this article)http://ssrn.com/abstract=878135 (policy analysis)http://ssrn.com/abstract=628223 (study of Korea)http://ssrn.com/abstract=682507 (summary article for a finance audience)http://ssrn.com/abstract=800584 (Germany-centered)http://ssrn.com/abstract=800604 (German language version of Germany-paper)http://ssrn.com/abstract=590913 (summary for practitioner audience)
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Directors are protected from personal liability by myriad factors.
“As Black, Cheffins, and Klausner (2006) powerfully argue and document, directors are protected from personal liability by myriad factors.”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Black, Cheffins, and Klausner (2006)
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Research works printed but not linked: 8
- Director Ronnie Chan was a billionaire real estate developer from Hong Kong. Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 873 (2005). At the time of Enron's downfall, members of Enron's board included
- Herbert S. Winokur, Jr. (Chair, CEO, Capricorn Holdings). See Marianne M. Jennings, Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=894921 272. See SEC v. Chancellor Corp., SEC Litig. Release No. 19,177, 2005 SEC Lexis 800 (Apr. 11, 2005) (announcing settlement);
- SEC v. Adley, SEC Litig. Release No. 18,104 (Apr. 24, 2003) (announcing initiation of proceedings), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/lit releases/lr18104.htm. For citations to officer-director bar cases against insiders, see 10
- Susan J. Stabile, I Believed My Employer and Didn't Sell My Company Stock: Is There an ERISA (or '34 Act) Remedy for Me?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 385, 386-88 (2004). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=894921 275. See In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2005) (confirming that beneficiaries under self-directed defined contribution plans can sue ERISA fiduciaries). These suits are brought derivatively by the beneficiaries on behalf of the plan. Theoretically, liability can exist for any company pension plan, but litigation to date has been limited to employee losses from investing in the company's own shares. 276. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 683-84 (
- U.S.C. § 1110(b) (2006) (permitting a plan to purchase insurance for a fiduciary). The terms of these policies are similar to D&O policies. See John Conley, Bear Fright; Market Volatility Strikes Fear in Fiduciaries, RISK MGMT., Sept. 1, 2000, at 28 (indicating that big companies always have ERISA insurance coverage). 285. See Conley, supra note 284, at 28. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=894921 286. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511
- Chem-Tronics Is Cleared in Shareholder's Suit, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1984; Interview with Plaintiff's Counsel (2005). Plaintiff's counsel's best recollection was that only officers were sued; the Wall Street Journal story reports that "directors" were sued. 301. See Matthey v. KDI Corp., 699 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Unclaimed Money To Fund UC Law Professorship, CINCINNATI POST, May 11, 1991, at 5A (discussing ultimate outcome of the case); US Breach Costs Ariadne $17 mil., HERALD (Australia), Dec. 21, 1988; Interview with Plaintiff's Counsel (2005). 302. See Leventhal v. Katy Indus., Inc., No. 85-459-JJF, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509 (
- D. Del. Sept. 1, 1989) (denying motion for new trial); Telephone Interview with Plaintiffs' Counsel (2005). 303. Securities Class Action Alert, Apr. 1990, at 46 (on file with authors). 304. Security Class Action Alert, July 1990, at 57; Security Class Action Alert, May 1991, at 21 (on file with authors). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=894921 305. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., No. C-84-20148(A)-JW, 1991 WL 238298 (
- N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2001) (rejecting motion to remove case to federal court). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=894921 359. On indemnification and insurance in corporate law trials, see Part II.A.2.d, supra. 360. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (involving a takeover case). 361. Kahn v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 1985 WL 4449, at *14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985) (involving a freeze-out case). The court found that the fair value of U.S. Sugar shares was $72, versus the $68 deal price. U.S. Sugar subsequently paid $4.7 million to settle the case.
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What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Metadata
- Authors
- Black, B. S., Cheffins, B. R., & Klausner, M.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Published
- 2006-05-01
- OpenAlex
- W7213365897
- Cited by
- 116
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 9
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Law › Corporate Insolvency and Governance
- Keywords
- independent directors, directors and officers insurance, securities class actions, corporate insolvency, directors' liability, corporate governance, settlement dynamics, public companies, corporate law, securities regulation
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