The Neural Substrates of Conscious Perception without Performance Confounds
Open accessAbstract
How does the brain give rise to consciousness? A common approach to addressing this question in neuroscience research involves analyzing differences in neural activity in experimental conditions where consciousness of a stimulus differs. However, unless careful measures are taken, conditions that differ in awareness typically also differ in perceptual task performance, e.g. stimulus detection and discrimination. A large body of research demonstrates that task performance and awareness can dissociate, indicating that they are separate mental processes with separate underlying mechanisms. Thus, task performance looms as a potential confound in consciousness science: computational and neural processes attributed to differences in consciousness may actually be better attributed to correlated but distinct differences in task performance. Here we present an extended exploration of the issue of task performance confounds in consciousness research. We describe the approach of performance matching (i.e. creating experimental conditions that yield identical task performance yet different levels of awareness) as a solution to the problem of performance confounds, and discuss why it is not appropriate to artificially match performance by post-hoc selection of trials (e.g. analyzing correct trials only). We review a growing literature demonstrating matched-performance / different-awareness effects using a variety of experimental designs and discuss signal detection theory models that can…
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The broader argument is that evidence for GWT is confounded by differences in performance between conscious and unconscious conditions.
“The broader argument here is that evidence for GWT is confounded by differences in performance between conscious and unconscious conditions (Morales et al. 2022).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Morales et al. 2022
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Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196 · see citing works
Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition
Rahnev, D., Balsdon, T., Charles, L., de Gardelle, V., Denison, R., Desender, K., Faivre, N., Filevich, E., Fleming, S. M., Jehee, J., et al. (2022) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221075615 · Cited by 63 · see citing works
Self-citationWinter, C. J., & Peters, M. A. K. (2022) · Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics · doi:10.3758/s13414-021-02358-2 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
- Authors
- Morales, J., Odegaard, B., & Maniscalco, B.
- Venue
- Neuroscience and Philosophy
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2022-02-01
- Pages
- 285-324
- OpenAlex
- W4226316601
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 22.03
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Keywords
- conscious perception, neural correlates, visual awareness
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