Economics and Psychology: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field
Abstract
Leading economics scholars consider the influence of psychology on economics, discussing topics including pro-social behavior, conditional trust, neuroeconomics, procedural utility, and happiness research. The integration of economics and psychology has created a vibrant and fruitful emerging field of study. The essays in Economics and Psychology take a broad view of the interface between these two disciplines, going beyond the usual focus on "behavioral economics." As documented in this volume, the influence of psychology on economics has been responsible for a view of human behavior that calls into question the assumption of complete rationality (and raises the possibility of altruistic acts), the acceptance of experiments as a valid method of economic research, and the idea that utility or well-being can be measured. The contributors, all leading researchers in the field, offer state-of-the-art discussions of such topics as pro-social behavior and the role of conditional cooperation and trust, happiness research as an empirical tool, the potential of neuroeconomics as a way to deepen understanding of individual decision making, and procedural utility as a concept that captures the well-being people derive directly from the processes and conditions leading to outcomes. Taken together, the essays in Economics and Psychology offer an assessment of where this new interdisciplinary field stands and what directions are most promising for future research, providing a useful guide for economists, psychologists, and social scientists.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In collective risk dilemmas and public goods games, individuals' non-binding pledges in the population can trigger conditional cooperation in subsequent rounds.
“For example, in collective risk dilemmas and public goods games, individuals’ non-binding pledges in the population can trigger conditional cooperation in subsequent rounds17,65.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [17]
In repeated public goods games, only a few individuals tend to be altruists or free-riders.
“Moreover, it has also been observed that, in repeated public goods games, most people behave like conditional cooperators—individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so—and only a few individuals tend to be altruists (i.e., unconditional cooperators) or free-riders16,17,27,75,76.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [17]
Most people behave like conditional cooperators, individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so.
“Moreover, it has also been observed that, in repeated public goods games, most people behave like conditional cooperators—individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so—and only a few individuals tend to be altruists (i.e., unconditional cooperators) or free-riders16,17,27,75,76.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [17]
The model's population composition of a small fraction of altruists and the rest conditional cooperators resembles behavioural regularities observed elsewhere.
“The population consists of N agents, with a small fraction consisting of altruists (i.e., agents who cooperate unconditionally), and the rest consisting of conditional cooperators (i.e., agents who are willing to cooperate if others do so); this resembles behavioural regularities observed elsewhere17,81.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [17]
The combination of conditional cooperative criterion values of the agents and noise mimics the behavioural regularities observed in repeated public goods games elsewhere.
“The combination of CCC values of the agents and mimics the behavioural regularities observed in repeated public goods games elsewhere17,81.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [17]
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Is Volunteering Rewarding in Itself?
MEIER, S., & STUTZER, A. (2008) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00597.x · Cited by 551 · see citing works
Cooperation without punishment
Battu, B., & Rahwan, T. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-28372-y · Cited by 12 · see citing works
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2007-05-18
- OpenAlex
- W1745551511
- Cited by
- 85
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 3.31
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- psychology and economics, behavioral economics, prosocial behavior, conditional trust, conditional cooperation, neuroeconomics, procedural utility, happiness research, well-being measurement, rationality assumption, altruism, individual decision-making
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
