Mental Reality
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Abstract
What is distinctive of the mental? In Mental Reality, Galen Strawson argues that the answer is not intelligence, representational content, or intentionality broadly understood, but conscious experience. Strawson challenges neobehaviorist accounts of the mental. He argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind is still confused by positivism and its various offspring. It gives undue primacy of place to nonmental phenomena, publicly observable phenomena, and behavioral phenomena in its account of the nature of mind. Strawson describes an alternative position, naturalized Cartesianism, that couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with respect for the idea that the only distinctively mental phenomena are those of conscious experience. Bradford Books imprint
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Citations
Cited by
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
Burge, T. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581405.001.0001 · Cited by 1,075
The Phenomenology of Cognition Or What Is It Like to Think That P?
PITT, D. (2004) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x · Cited by 500
Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics
Bobonich, C. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199251436.001.0001 · Cited by 308
Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - Cognition
Wilson, R. A. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511606847 · Cited by 276
Metadata
- Authors
- Strawson, G.
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 1994-11-17
- OpenAlex
- W4312294424
- Cited by
- 602
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.34
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Mental Reality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.7551/mitpress/4551.001.0001
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- Strawson, G. (1994). Mental Reality. The MIT Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4551.001.0001
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