The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Phenomenology of Cognition Or What Is It Like to Think That P?
Abstract
A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections. The second argument uses what I call “minimal pair” experiences—sentences read without and with understanding—to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objections are considered and rebutted.
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Cites
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A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND
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Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
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Cited by
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-037 · Cited by 658
Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Stoljar, D. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001 · Cited by 191
Bayne, T. (2008) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00122.x · Cited by 107
Metadata
- Authors
- PITT, D.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-07
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-36
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2057597914
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 22.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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