The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Minds, Brains, and Programs
Abstract
This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions.(1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality.(2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality.These two propositions have the following consequences (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program.This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain.This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain.This follows from 2 and 4."Could a machine think?"On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.
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Cites
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Kensler, G. L., & Gibson, J. J. (1969) · Studies in Art Education · doi:10.2307/1319633 · Cited by 2,747
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology
Fodor, J. A. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00001771 · Cited by 1,485
Computing Machinery and Intelligence
Turing, A. M. (2009) · Parsing the Turing Test · doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6710-5_3 · Cited by 1,367
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GPS, A PROGRAM THAT SIMULATES HUMAN THOUGHT
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Intentional communication in the chimpanzee: The development of deception
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Cited by
Chapelle, C. A. (2003) · Language Learning & Language Teaching · doi:10.1075/lllt.7 · Cited by 377
Responsible AI in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities
(2023) · Social and Cultural Studies of Robots and AI · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-08215-3 · Cited by 82
The conductor model of consciousness, our neuromorphic twins, and the human-AI deal
Benitez, F., Pennartz, C., & Senn, W. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/gbzd6 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Searle, J. R.
- Venue
- Mind Design II
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 1997-03-06
- Pages
- 183-204
- OpenAlex
- W4376583107
- Cited by
- 329
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 4.46
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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