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Representation and Reality
Abstract
Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind. Bradford Books imprint
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Citations
Cited by
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality
Gopnik, A. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028636 · Cited by 967
Jackendoff, R. (1991) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(91)90031-x · Cited by 648
GOLDMAN, A. I. (1989) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1989.tb00249.x · Cited by 576
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
Johnson, M., & Fodor, J. A. (1988) · Language · doi:10.2307/414573 · Cited by 501
The psychology of folk psychology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028648 · Cited by 469
Metadata
- Authors
- Putnam, H.
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 1988-06-21
- OpenAlex
- W4301663117
- Cited by
- 1,166
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.77
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Representation and Reality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.7551/mitpress/5891.001.0001
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- Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and Reality. The MIT Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5891.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.