The Brain's Representational Power: On Consciousness and the Integration of Modalities
Abstract
A neuroscientifically informed theory arguing that the core of qualitative conscious experience arises from the integration of sensory and cognitive modalities. Although science has made considerable progress in discovering the neural basis of cognitive processes, how consciousness arises remains elusive. In this book, Cyriel Pennartz analyzes which aspects of conscious experience can be peeled away to access its core: the “hardest” aspect, the relationship between brain processes and the subjective, qualitative nature of consciousness. Pennartz traces the problem back to its historical roots in the foundations of neuroscience and connects early ideas on sensory processing to contemporary computational neuroscience. What can we learn from neural network models, and where do they fall short in bridging the gap between neural processes and conscious experience? Do neural models of cognition resemble inanimate systems, and how can this help us define requirements for conscious processing in the brain? These questions underlie Pennartz's examination of the brain's anatomy and neurophysiology. The perspective of his account is not limited to visual perception but broadened to include other sensory modalities and their integration. Formulating a representational theory of the neural basis of consciousness, Pennartz outlines properties that complex structures must express to process information consciously. This theoretical framework is constructed using empirical findings from neur…
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In NREP, conscious phenomenology is characterized by five inalienable hallmarks that together define conscious experience as a multimodal, situational survey of the agent's world, including its body.
“In NREP, conscious phenomenology is characterized by five inalienable hallmarks.Together, these define conscious experience as a multimodal, situational survey of the agent's world, including its body.12,13,53”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [12]
Widespread evidence suggests that prediction or representation is a key brain function in realizing a plethora of sensory, motor, and cognitive processes, some carried out consciously and others not.
“Widespread evidence suggests that prediction or representation is a key brain function in realizing a plethora of sensory, motor, and cognitive processes”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [12]
NREP posits that motor actions are not needed per se for consciousness.
“NREP takes the computational principles of PP to build sensory-based models of inferential representation learning, positing that motor actions are not needed per se for consciousness.12,13,53”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [12]
Both IIT and NREP propose that, in a changeable visual environment, different, switchable subsets of brain areas will engage in feedforward and feedback interactions to ensure integration of visual features, depending on the visual submodalities being part of the subject's experience.
“Both IIT and NREP propose that, in a changeable visual environment, different, switchable subsets of brain areas will engage in feedforward and feedback interactions to ensure integration of visual features, depending on the visual submodalities being part of the subject's experience.12,88”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [12]
NREP delineates a hallmark of conscious experience: the combination of dynamics and stability, where stability is the capacity to perceive the outer world and its objects as a stable whole despite eye, head, and body movements.
“Among the hallmarks of conscious experience delineated by NREP, we find the combination of dynamics and stability, where ''stability'' refers to the capacity to perceive the outer world and its objects as a stable whole, despite the occurrence of eye, head, and body movements.12,13”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [12]
In IIT, brain complexity explains general phenomenal properties (unity and richness) that are immediate and common to each and every experience.
“In IIT, brain complexity explains general phenomenal properties (unity and richness) that are ''immediate'' and common to each and every experience, while both NREP and PP in general take conscious experience to be representational-a best guess ''simulacrum'' of external reality.12,13,175,176”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [12]
NREP interprets consciousness as furnishing the subject of experience with a unified, dynamic, multimodal 'survey' (or 'world-model') of unfolding bodily and environmental conditions.
“NREP interprets consciousness as furnishing the subject of experience with a unified, dynamic, multimodal 'survey' (or 'world -model') of unfolding bodily and environmental conditions (Pennartz, 2015, ch. 6).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Pennartz, 2015
Dreaming is conceived of as a 'virtual reality' state characterised by being less susceptible to cognitive control and less strongly coupled to output systems for goal-directed behaviour.
“For instance, dreaming is conceived of as a 'virtual reality' state characterised by being less susceptible to cognitive control and less strongly coupled to output systems for goal-directed behaviour (Pennartz, 2015).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Pennartz, 2015
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Cited by 43
- Authors
- Pennartz, C. M. A.
- Corresponding author
- Pennartz, Cyriel M.A.
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2015-09-18
- OpenAlex
- W2413648480
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 1.92
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Keywords
- consciousness, qualia, sensory integration, multimodal integration, neural basis of consciousness, computational neuroscience, neural network model, mind-brain relationship, animal consciousness, robot consciousness, visual perception, neuropsychology
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