The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction
Abstract
This chapter discusses the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, also known as the Vickrey auction. It presents several virtues of a VCG auction, which include the dominant strategy property and its scope of application, and its weaknesses that are responsible for the rarity of the VCG mechanism in practice. In this mechanism, efficient allocation of all packages is made in order to maximize total value and the winner achieves a profit that is similar to his incremental contribution to the total value. The chapter emphasizes that more practical procedures are required to remove imperfections and other limitations of the Vickrey auction that are decisive for most practical applications. These shortcomings include the possibility of generating very low revenues and the chances of discouraging value-creating mergers among bidders. Also, in this type of auction, bidders are asked to reveal values for all packages without providing any information regarding prices of items.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Groves, T. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914085 · Cited by 3,284
Multipart pricing of public goods
Clarke, E. H. (1971) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01726210 · Cited by 3,246
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Self-citationEnvelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
Milgrom, P., & Segal, I. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00296 · Cited by 1,235
Self-citationAn Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
Ausubel, L. M. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052330 · Cited by 727
Self-citationMcMillan, J. (1994) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.3.145 · Cited by 699
Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
Milgrom, P. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262118 · Cited by 678
Self-citationIncentives in Public Decision-Making.
Hammond, P. J., Green, J. R., & Laffont, J.-J. (1980) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2231809 · Cited by 609
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Ausubel, L. M., & Milgrom, P. (2002) · The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · doi:10.2202/1534-5963.1019 · Cited by 559
Self-citation
Cited by
Some simple economics of the blockchain
Catalini, C., & Gans, J. S. (2020) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3359552 · Cited by 459
Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain
Catalini, C., & Gans, J. (2016) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w22952 · Cited by 403
Luong, N. C., Hoang, D. T., Wang, P., Niyato, D., Kim, D. I., & Han, Z. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2582841 · Cited by 357
A Survey on Big Data Market: Pricing, Trading and Protection
Liang, F., Yu, W., An, D., Yang, Q., Fu, X., & Zhao, W. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2806881 · Cited by 356
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M. (2012) · Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 · Cited by 337
Metadata
- Authors
- Ausubel, L. M., & Milgrom, P.
- Venue
- Combinatorial Auctions
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2005-12-09
- Pages
- 17-40
- OpenAlex
- W1558004581
- Cited by
- 525
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 62.71
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002
- The paper
- Ausubel, L. M., & Milgrom, P. (2005). The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction. Combinatorial Auctions. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.