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Cited by 525

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction

Ausubel, Lawrence M., Milgrom, Paul·2005·Combinatorial Auctions

Abstract

This chapter discusses the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, also known as the Vickrey auction. It presents several virtues of a VCG auction, which include the dominant strategy property and its scope of application, and its weaknesses that are responsible for the rarity of the VCG mechanism in practice. In this mechanism, efficient allocation of all packages is made in order to maximize total value and the winner achieves a profit that is similar to his incremental contribution to the total value. The chapter emphasizes that more practical procedures are required to remove imperfections and other limitations of the Vickrey auction that are decisive for most practical applications. These shortcomings include the possibility of generating very low revenues and the chances of discouraging value-creating mergers among bidders. Also, in this type of auction, bidders are asked to reveal values for all packages without providing any information regarding prices of items.

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Crossref · 10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002

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Metadata

Authors
Ausubel, L. M., & Milgrom, P.
Venue
Combinatorial Auctions
Publisher
The MIT Press
Published
2005-12-09
Pages
17-40
OpenAlex
W1558004581
Cited by
525
References
17
FWCI
62.71
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002
The paper
Ausubel, L. M., & Milgrom, P. (2005). The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction. Combinatorial Auctions. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.