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Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Open access
Parkes, David C. · 2005 · Combinatorial Auctions

Abstract

This chapter offers information on iterative combinatorial auctions (CAs) that help in solving the problem of costly preference elicitation that arises due to the hard problem of winner determination. In this auction mechanism, bidders are allowed to submit multiple bids and are also provided with information feedback so that they can use this feedback and price discovery in expressing their preferences. Iterative CAs help in the verification and validation of an auction outcome, and also enhance revenue and efficiency in single item auctions by facilitating exchange of value information between bidders. The chapter also discusses the concepts of minimal competitive equilibrium (CE) prices and universal CE prices for CAs, which have a role in the preference elicitation problem. Several other issues, including the design space of iterative CAs and price-based iterative CAs, and a case study of an efficient ascending price auction, are also presented.

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Metadata

Authors
Parkes, D. C.
Venue
Combinatorial Auctions
Publisher
The MIT Press
Published
2005-12-09
Pages
41-78
OpenAlex
W2141679133
Cited by
162
References
0
FWCI
34.49
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0003
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Parkes, D. C. (2005). Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. Combinatorial Auctions. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0003

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