Better Than Conscious?: DECISION MAKING, the HUMAN MIND, and IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
Experts discuss the implications of the ways humans reach decisions through the conscious and subconscious processing of information. Conscious control enables human decision makers to override routines, to exercise willpower, to find innovative solutions, to learn by instruction, to decide collectively, and to justify their choices. These and many more advantages, however, come at a price: the ability to process information consciously is severely limited and conscious decision makers are liable to hundreds of biases. Measured against the norms of rational choice theory, conscious decision makers perform poorly. But if people forego conscious control, in appropriate tasks, they perform surprisingly better: they handle vast amounts of information; they update prior information; they find appropriate solutions to ill-defined problems. This inaugural Strüngmann Forum Report explores the human ability to make decisions, consciously as well as without conscious control. It explores decision-making strategies, including deliberate and intuitive; explicit and implicit; processing information serially and in parallel, with a general-purpose apparatus, or with task-specific neural subsystems. The analysis is at four levels—neural, psychological, evolutionary, and institutional—and the discussion is extended to the definition of social problems and the design of better institutional interventions. The results presented differ greatly from what could be expected under standard rational choice theory and deviate even more from the alternate behavioral view of institutions. New challenges emerge (for example, the issue of free will) and some purported social problems almost disappear if one adopts a more adequate model of human decision making.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573
Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence.
Pleskac, T. J., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2010) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0019737 · Cited by 722
Ecology in an anthropogenic biosphere
Ellis, E. C. (2015) · Ecological Monographs · doi:10.1890/14-2274.1 · Cited by 632
Raafat, R. M., Chater, N., & Frith, C. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.08.002 · Cited by 479
Opponency revisited: competition and cooperation between dopamine and serotonin
Boureau, Y.-L., & Dayan, P. (2011) · Neuropsychopharmacology · doi:10.1038/npp.2010.151 · Cited by 456
Metadata
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2008-05-09
- OpenAlex
- W604139775
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.37
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Better Than Conscious?: DECISION MAKING, the HUMAN MIND, and IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.7551/mitpress/9780262195805.001.0001
- The paper
- Better Than Conscious?: DECISION MAKING, the HUMAN MIND, and IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS. (2008). The MIT Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262195805.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.