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Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory

Hill, Thomas E. · 2020 · Cornell University Press eBooks

Abstract

In this collection of eleven papers, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., addresses the most central and difficult concepts in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, as well as more specific moral issues drawn from his later ethical writings. Among the topics Hill discusses are hypothetical and categorical imperatives, formulas of the supreme moral principle, autonomy and practical reason, and the argument for the rationality of moral commitment. He is also concerned with types of duty, theory of punishment, moral responses to terrorism, and relations between Kant's moral theory and John Rawls's theory of justice. Hill treats Kant's work respectfully and constructively, while maintaining a degree of judicious doubt. Rather than belaboring familiar objections, he tries to interpret and reconstruct central ideas as worthy of contemporary attention although often in need of revision and development. Explaining difficult texts clearly without oversimplifying Kant 's distinctive message, he presents a broad view of Kant's basic ideas of autonomy, practical reason, moral legislation, and the aims of moral theory. A major statement on Kant's moral thought, this outstanding collection will be rewarding reading for professional philosophers, teachers of Kant's ethics, and students, as well as political theorists.

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Metadata

Authors
Hill, T. E.
Venue
Cornell University Press eBooks
Published
2020-05-27
OpenAlex
W1504902748
Cited by
383
References
0
FWCI
24.20
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.7591/9781501735035
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Hill, T. E. (2020). Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory. Cornell University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501735035

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