Semmann, Dirk

Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’

Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) · Nature

Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Cited by 1,371

Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy?

Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Bakker, T. C. M., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences

Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Cited by 288

Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation

Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H. (2002) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences

Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Cited by 285

Co-evolution of behaviour and social network structure promotes human cooperation: Cooperation and self-organization in networks

Fehl, K., van der Post, D. J., & Semmann, D. (2011) · Ecology Letters

Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Cited by 220

Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion

Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R., & Marotzke, J. (2016) · Nature Communications

Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Cited by 62

Costs for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour

Bednarik, P., Fehl, K., & Semmann, D. (2014) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Cited by 49