Cited by 49Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Applications

Costs for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour

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Bednarik, Peter, Fehl, Katrin, Semmann, Dirk·2014·Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Abstract

Social networks represent the structuring of interactions between group members. Above all, many interactions are profoundly cooperative in humans and other animals. In accordance with this natural observation, theoretical work demonstrates that certain network structures favour the evolution of cooperation. Yet, recent experimental evidence suggests that static networks do not enhance cooperative behaviour in humans. By contrast, dynamic networks do foster cooperation. However, costs associated with dynamism such as time or resource investments in finding and establishing new partnerships have been neglected so far. Here, we show that human participants are much less likely to break links when costs arise for building new links. Especially, when costs were high, the network was nearly static. Surprisingly, cooperation levels in Prisoner's Dilemma games were not affected by reduced dynamism in social networks. We conclude that the mere potential to quit collaborations is sufficient in humans to reach high levels of cooperative behaviour. Effects of self-structuring processes or assortment on the network played a minor role: participants simply adjusted their cooperative behaviour in response to the threats of losing a partner or of being expelled.

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  • Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation.

    “Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”

    From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [26]

    The Introduction reports that human cooperation is substantially higher in dynamic than static networks, supporting a link between network change and cooperation. But the Discussion describes conflicting expectations about partner switching, and the Abstract says cooperation was surprisingly unaffected when switching costs reduced network dynamics. The paper therefore does not support the claim that endogenous transitions often yield predictable results. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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Authors
Bednarik, P., Fehl, K., & Semmann, D.
Affiliations
University of Göttingen (DE)
Venue
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Published
2014-10-07
Volume
281
Issue
1792
Pages
20141661
ISSN
  • 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
  • 0962-8452
  • 1471-2954
OpenAlex
W2060830396
Cited by
49
References
54
Citations by year
2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 1
FWCI
22.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • GRO (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • WU Research (submittedVersion)
Funders
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
evolution of cooperation, social network dynamics, link formation costs, partner change, prisoner's dilemma, network structure, self-structuring, product assortment
MeSH terms
Cooperative Behavior, Female, Game Theory, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Male, Young Adult, Social Networking

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