The Hard Problem of Consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods. The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. Once we have specified the neural or computational mechanism that performs the function of verbal report, for example, the bulk of our work in explaining reportability is over. Baars theory of cognitive accessibility addresses many aspects of human cognition and shows promise as a theory of awareness, the functional correlate of conscious experience, but an explanation of experience itself is not on offer. The key is the conceptual point that the explanation of functions does not suffice for the explanation of experience.
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Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150
Cited by
Francken, J. C., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J. D., Seth, A. K., & van Gaal, S. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac011 · Cited by 136
Francken, J., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J., Seth, A., & van Gaal, S. (2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/8mbsk · Cited by 20
Stucky, B. (2025) · Nature and Science of Sleep · doi:10.2147/nss.s506461 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D.
- Venue
- The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-03-17
- Pages
- 32-42
- OpenAlex
- W4237674828
- Cited by
- 118
- References
- 2
- Type
- other
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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