The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Game Theory and Information Economics
Abstract
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the key concepts in game theory and information economics. Broadly, game theory and information economics are powerful tools in designing appropriate incentives to align the interests of various stakeholders, including providers, patients, payers, and innovators, among others. The field of healthcare operations management is different, in that few analytical modeling papers use game theory and information economics. The birth and refinement of game theory and information economics have been inspired largely by certain distinguishing characteristics of the healthcare industry. Surprisingly, until the past decade, the applications of these tools have been rather limited in the healthcare operations management literature. In the healthcare setting, moral hazard has been commonly attributed to the over-provision of medical resources. Kenneth Arrow argues that the lack of price and quality information makes the healthcare market markedly different from most other markets for goods and services.
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Cites
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Uncertainty and The Welfare Economics of Medical Care
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The economics of moral hazard: comment
Pauly, M. V. (1982) · Readings in the Economics of Contract Law · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528248.009 · Cited by 987
On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods
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Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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Cited by
OM Forum—Healthcare Operations Management: A Snapshot of Emerging Research
Dai, T., & Tayur, S. (2020) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2019.0778 · Cited by 147
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dai, T.
- Venue
- Handbook of Healthcare Analytics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2018-08-03
- Pages
- 337-354
- OpenAlex
- W2886075122
- Cited by
- 401
- References
- 39
- Type
- other
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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